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I.

INTRODUCTION

International legal theory and international relations theory have long focused on
the state as the principal unit of analysis.1 From this traditional interstate
perspective, the state is a unitary actor that “faces the outside world as an integrated
unit” and speaks with one voice in its interactions with other unitary states.2
According to this view, “the paradigmatic form of international cooperation is the
multilateral international convention, negotiated over many years in various
international watering holes, signed and ratified with attendant flourish and
formality, and given continuing life through the efforts of an international
secretariat.” 3 The implication of the traditional interstate approach is that the key
to understanding international legal and regulatory cooperation is to understand
interactions among unitary states within frameworks agreed upon in formal treaties.
Notwithstanding the importance of interstate cooperation in world politics, this
traditional approach obscures an increasingly important form of cooperation:
1
Regarding international law, see e.g., J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 1 (6th ed.
1963) (defining international law as “the body of rules and principles of action which are
binding upon civilized states in their relations with one another”) and IAN BROWNLIE,
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 59 (5th ed.1998) (identifying states as most
important category of legal persons under international law). Regarding international
relations theory, see e.g., PAUL R. VIOTTI & MARK V. KAUPPI, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
THEORY: REALISM, PLURALISM, GLOBALISM, AND BEYOND 6 (3d ed. 1999) (noting that
according to realist international relations theory, states are the most important actors) and
KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 79 and 94-95 (1979) (arguing that
states are the defining units of the international system). In international law, a state is
defined as possessing the following characteristics: (a) a permanent population, (b) a defined
territory, (c) government, and (d) capacity to enter into foreign relations with other states.
BROWNLIE, at 70. This definition generally does not include states in federal unions (such as
state of the United States), provinces, or other sub-state units. THOMAS BUERGENTHAL &
HAROLD G. MAIER, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 2 (2d ed. 1990).
2
VIOTTI & KAUPPI, supra note 1 at 6.
3
ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 12-13 (2004) [hereinafter
SLAUGHTER, NEW WORLD ORDER]
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transgovernmental cooperation. This form of cooperation is characterized by
transgovernmental networks, which are “pattern[s] of regular and purposive
relations among like government units working across the borders that divide
countries from one another and that demarcate the ‘domestic’ from the
‘international’ sphere.”4 Political scientist and legal scholar Anne-Marie Slaughter
argues in a new book that this form of cooperation is becoming so widespread and
important that it constitutes a “new world order.”5
To understand this new order, Slaughter calls on scholars to change the way they
look at the world substantially:
[T]o see these networks as they exist, much less to imagine what they could
become, requires a deep conceptual shift. Stop imagining the international
system as a system of states—unitary entities like billiard balls or black
boxes—subject to rules created by international institutions that are apart
from, “above” these states. Start thinking about a world of governments,
with all the different institutions that perform the basic functions of
governments—legislation, adjudication, implementation—interacting both
with each other domestically and also with their foreign and supranational
counterparts.6
This conceptual shift promises new insights on international legal and regulatory
cooperation. Indeed, the existing scholarship on transgovernmental cooperation,
which includes Slaughter’s book as well as her earlier articles,7 the seminal work of
political scientists Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye,8 and recent work by legal
scholar and political scientist Kal Raustiala,9 has already documented the rise of
transgovernmental legal and regulatory networks, addressed important normative
4

Id. at 14.
Id. at 15-18. See also Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, FOREIGN
AFF. 184 (Sept./Oct. 1997) [hereinafter Real Order].
6
SLAUGHTER, NEW WORLD ORDER, supra note 3, at 5.
7
SLAUGHTER, NEW WORLD ORDER, supra note 3; Slaughter, Real Order, supra note 5;
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Agencies on the Loose? Holding Government Networks Accountable,
in TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY COOPERATION: LEGAL PROBLEMS AND POLITICAL
PROSPECTS 521 (George A. Bermann, Matthias Herdegen & Peter L. Lindseth, eds., 2000)
[hereinafter Slaughter, Agencies on the Loose]; Anne-Marie Slaughter, Governing the Global
Economy through Government Networks, in THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS:
ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Michael Byers ed., 2000)
[hereinafter Slaughter, Global Economy]; and Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Accountability of
Government Networks, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 347 (2001) [hereinafter Slaughter,
Accountability].
8
Joseph S. Nye, Jr. & Robert O. Keohane, Transnational Relations and World Politics:
An Introduction, 25 INT’L. ORG. 329 (1971) and Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye,
Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations, 27 WORLD POL. 39 (1974)
[hereinafter Keohane & Nye, Transgovernmental Relations].
9
Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental
Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 1 (2002).
5
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and empirical implications, and identified factors that help explain the rise of
transgovernmentalism in general.10
But why is legal and regulatory cooperation among some states and in some
issue areas principally interstate, while among other states and in other issue areas
it is primarily transgovernmental? In other words, what determines whether
cooperation is likely to be interstate or transgovernmental? More generally, what
explains variations in levels of transgovernmentalism across different groups of
states and across different issue areas? So far legal scholars and political scientists
have devoted relatively little attention to these questions, leaving a significant gap
in the literature on transgovernmental cooperation.11
The principal goal of this article is to contribute to the scholarship on
transgovernmental legal and regulatory networks and transgovernmentalism in
general by taking a modest step toward filling that gap. To accomplish this, this
article uses two analytical tools from the discipline of political science: the concept
of transgovernmental relations12 and the theory of rational institutional design.13 It
applies these tools to develop a rational design theory of transgovernmentalism
aimed at explaining the conditions under which legal and regulatory cooperation is
more likely to be transgovernmental versus interstate.14
Because transgovernmentalism has potentially profound implications not only
for cooperation across borders but also for governance within borders, the
questions raised by this article have not only international but also domestic
importance. By definition, transgovernmental networks involve domestic legal and
regulatory agencies that are part of domestic governmental structures. On the one
hand, transgovernmental cooperation can enhance the ability of these agencies to
efficiently and effectively pursue their domestic mandates. On the other hand,
there is considerable concern that domestic agencies participating in
transgovernmental networks lack democratic accountability, leading some to fear
the advent of “agencies on the loose.”15 Among the concerns are lack of
transparency and the distortion of domestic political processes.16
Thus,
understanding transgovernmental networks is important not only for scholars of
10

See infra Part II.C.
See infra Part II.C.
12
See infra Part II.B.
13
See infra Part III.A. A secondary goal of this article is to contribute to rational
institutional design scholarship. The existing scholarship focuses primarily on formal
international organizations and has not yet been explicitly applied to transgovernmental
networks. This article’s rational design theory of transgovernmentalism attempts to do
exactly that, using the logic of rational design to help understand the emergence of
transgovernmental legal and regulatory networks.
14
See infra Part III.
15
This phrase is from the title of a book chapter by Anne-Marie Slaughter, in which she
discusses and responds to these concerns. Slaughter, Agencies on the Loose, supra note 7.
16
See SLAUGHTER, NEW WORLD ORDER, supra note 3, at 219-224 (acknowledging these
concerns) and 230-244 (proposing solutions to these problems).
11
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international law and politics, but also domestic law and politics.
The article proceeds in four main parts. Part II will compare the traditional
concept of interstate relations with the concept of transgovernmental relations. Part
II will then review the existing scholarship on transgovernmental relations, relating
it to the article’s central research question: What accounts for varying levels of
transgovernmentalism across different groups of states and across different issue
areas? Part III will develop a rational design theory of transgovernmentalism that
responds to this question. The first section of Part III will apply the theory of
rational institutional design to the concept of transgovernmentalism, framing
interstate versus transgovernmental cooperation as a design choice by heads of state
or regulators. The second section of Part III will state several preconditions for
transgovernmental cooperation that are assumed by the rational design theory of
transgovernmentalism. The third section of Part III will identify the theory’s
dependent and explanatory variables. The final section of Part III will use the
rational design theory of transgovernmentalism to derive a series of conjectures
about how the level of transgovernmentalism (the dependent variable) is likely to
be affected by distribution problems; preference heterogeneity; enforcement
problems; high politics; issue complexity; agency autonomy; and antecedent
interactions in interstate organizations (the explanatory variables). Part IV will
apply the conjectures from Part III to the case of European Union (E.U.)-United
States (U.S.) merger review cooperation as an initial plausibility test of the rational
design theory of transgovernmentalism. The theory and case study suggest that
issue complexity, preference heterogeneity among states, and enforcement
problems are among the factors that may significantly influence levels of
transgovernmentalism.
II. TWO FORMS OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL AND REGULATORY COOPERATION
This article considers two forms of international legal and regulatory
cooperation. First, international legal and regulatory cooperation may consist of
interstate cooperation between two states. For example, the states may negotiate,
sign and ratify a treaty requiring them to cause certain legal or regulatory steps to
be taken inside their respective borders. Alternatively, international legal and
regulatory cooperation may entail transgovernmental cooperation, involving direct
cross-border interaction between the states’ government lawyers and regulators.
This part of the article explains these two forms of international legal and
regulatory cooperation in more detail, briefly surveys the existing scholarly
literature on transgovernmentalism, and relates this literature to the article’s central
research question: What accounts for varying levels of transgovernmentalism
across different groups of states and across different issue areas?
A.

Interstate Cooperation

As Nye and Keohane explain, “Students and practitioners of international
politics have traditionally concentrated their attention on relationships between
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states. The state, regarded as an actor with purposes and power, is the basic unit of
action . . . . Most political scientists and many diplomats seem to accept this view
of reality, and a state-centric view of world affairs prevails.”17 This interstate
vision of international cooperation relies on two central assumptions: (1) that states
are the most important actors in world politics, and therefore the key unit of
analysis for scholars of international cooperation; and (2) that states are unitary
actors.18 Various forms of these simplifying assumptions are shared by many of
the most influential theories of world politics, including realism,19 regime theory,20
constructivism,21 and, to a limited extent, liberal international relations theory.22
Moreover, these assumptions are implicit in traditional definitions of international
law.23
A critical implication of the first assumption, that the state is the principal unit of
analysis, is that heads of state are the principal negotiators of cooperation in world
politics. As Slaughter characterizes this assumption, “it is the head of state who is
the embodiment and representative of the State in the international system, the
gatekeeper for all interactions, both domestic and international.”24 In the words of
Mark Pollack and Gregory Shaffer, the assumption is that heads of state “enjoy a
monopoly on the external representation of their respective states.”25 This suggests
that significant international legal and regulatory cooperation is likely to occur only
if heads of state agree to it.
The second assumption, that states are unitary actors, implies that international
cooperation is cooperation between states qua states. In negotiations, each state is
presumed to speak with a single voice, represented by either its head of state or
foreign minister. To the extent there are policy disagreements between different

17

Nye & Keohane, supra note 8, at 329.
VIOTTI & KAUPPI, supra note 1, at 6.
19
Id. at 6. For an important statement of classical realism, see HANS J. MORGENTHAU,
POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE (5th ed. revised, 1978),
and for a leading statement of neorealism (sometimes called “structural realism”), see
WALTZ, supra note 1.
20
See, e.g., ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE
WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY 25 (1984) (“our analysis of international cooperation and
regimes therefore focuses principally on states”) [hereinafter KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY].
21
See, e.g., ALEXANDER WENDT, SOCIAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 43 and
197 (1999) (defending the unitary actor assumption).
22
Mark A. Pollack & Gregory C. Shaffer, Transatlantic Governance in Historical and
Theoretical Perspective, in TRANSATLANTIC GOVERNANCE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 24
(Mark A. Pollack & Gregory C. Shaffer, eds., 2001) (noting that in the two-level games
model, heads of state enjoy a monopoly on the external representation of their respective
states).
23
See, e.g., BRIERLY, supra note 1.
24
Slaughter, Global Economy, supra note 7, at 177
25
Pollack & Shaffer, supra note 22, at 24. This is not an assumption that these authors
are necessarily committed to.
18
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institutions within a state, such as disagreements with or between relevant legal or
regulatory agencies, the assumption is that these differences are worked out
domestically. As Slaughter notes, “the analytical lens of the unitary state obscures
the very existence of these different government institutions.”26 Moreover, if an
agreement is reached, the resulting cooperation is deemed to consist of actions
taken by states as such. For example, if a state joins a treaty for reducing emissions
of a pollutant, the only relevant question is whether the state’s emissions conform
to agreed-upon levels. The state’s efforts to comply with the treaty may involve
activities of a governmental subunit, such as an environmental agency; but the
interstate image implies that the scope of such activity is principally domestic and
does not significantly extend beyond the state’s borders.27
B.

Transgovernmental Cooperation

An alternative to the interstate approach began to emerge in the 1970s in the
work of political scientists Keohane and Nye, who developed a concept of
transgovernmental relations.28 Keohane and Nye define transgovernmental
relations as “sets of direct interactions among sub-units of different governments
that are not controlled or closely guided by the policies of the cabinets or chief
executives of those governments.”29
Based on their definition, the
transgovernmental approach differs from the interstate approach in two
fundamental ways. First, the transgovernmental approach focuses on interactions
26

SLAUGHTER, NEW WORLD ORDER, supra note 3, at 13.
This is consistent with the current state of public international law: “individual
government institutions cannot be subjected to specific obligations or duties under
international law. Nor can they exercise specific rights. Sovereignty is possessed by the
state as a whole, not by its component parts.” SLAUGHTER, NEW WORLD ORDER, supra note
3, at 34.
28
Nye & Keohane, Transnational Relations, supra note 8. Keohane and Nye note,
however, that other scholars, such as Raymond Aron, Philip Jessup, Karl Kaiser, Horst
Menderhausen, and James Rosenau used non-”state centric” concepts like “transnational
relations” before they did. Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Preface, 25 INT’L ORG.
v (1971). Keohane and Nye explain that their interest in the concept of transnational
relations was originally a response to what they viewed as an overemphasis on the study of
formal international organizations. Id. Later, they refined their concept to distinguish
between transnational relations, which they restricted to nongovernmental actors, and
transgovernmental relations, which refers to interactions among sub-units of governments.
Keohane & Nye, Transgovernmental Relations, supra note 8.
29
Id. at 43. Keohane and Nye also distinguished between two major types of
transgovernmental
relations:
policy
coordination
and
coalition
building.
“Transgovernmental policy coordination refers to activity designed to facilitate smooth
implementation or adjustment of policy, in the absence of detailed higher policy directives.”
At its most basic, this simply involves “informal communication among working-level
officials of different bureaucracies.” In contrast, “transgovernmental coalition building takes
place when sub-units build coalitions with like-minded agencies from other governments
against elements of their own administrative structures.” Id. at 44.
27
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among government subunits, whereas the interstate approach emphasizes
interactions among states.30 Second, the transgovernmental approach assumes that
government subunits can act autonomously from states,31 whereas the interstate
approach treats states as unitary actors.32
Recently, Slaughter began building on earlier work on transgovernmental
relations, introducing her own concept of “transgovernmental networks” in an
influential 1997 article in Foreign Affairs.33 Reacting to an argument made in an
earlier issue of Foreign Affairs34 that power in world politics is shifting from states
to non-state actors,35 Slaughter argued that “[t]he state is not disappearing, it is
disaggregating into its separate functionally distinct parts. These parts—courts,
regulatory agencies, executives, and even legislatures—are networking with their
counterparts abroad, creating a dense web of relations that constitutes a new,
transgovernmental order.”36 Emphasizing the growing importance of these
networks, Slaughter contends that the most important actors in world politics are no
longer foreign ministries and heads of state, but rather the same types of
government institutions that are important in domestic politics, such as
administrative agencies, courts, and legislatures.37
Slaughter defines transgovernmental networks as “pattern[s] of regular and
purposive relations among like government units working across the borders that
divide countries from one another and that demarcate the ‘domestic’ from the
‘international’ sphere.”38 She then distinguishes among three different types of
transgovernmental networks.39 First, there are government networks within
international organizations.40 Second, there are government networks within the
framework of agreements negotiated by heads of state,41 a network type that
30

See supra Part II.A.
As Keohane and Nye note, subunit autonomy is a “matter of degree.” Keohane & Nye,
Transgovernmental Relations, supra note 8, at 44.
32
See supra Part II.A.
33
Slaughter, Real Order, supra note 5.
34
Jessica T. Mathews, Power Shift, FOREIGN AFF. 50 (Jan./Feb. 1997).
35
Slaughter, Real Order, supra note 5, at 183 (discussing Matthews, supra note 34).
36
Slaughter, Real Order, supra note 5, at 184.
37
Slaughter, Global Economy, supra note 7, at 178.
38
SLAUGHTER, NEW WORLD ORDER, supra note 3, at 14.
39
SLAUGHTER, NEW WORLD ORDER, supra note 3, at 45-49. See also Anne-Marie
Slaughter, Global Government Networks, Global Information Agencies, and Disaggregated
Democracy, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1041, 1053-1058 (2003).
40
SLAUGHTER, NEW WORLD ORDER, supra note 3, at 45-46. Examples of this type
include networks among trade ministers in the framework of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, finance ministers in the International Monetary Fund, defense and foreign
ministers in NATO, central bankers in the Bank for International Settlements, and economic
and regulatory officials in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Id.
at 46.
41
Id. at 46-48. Examples of this type include interactions between American and
31
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Slaughter says “is more striking as a form of governance, in that it emerges outside
formal international institutions. Nevertheless, the members of these networks
operate within a framework agreed on at least by the heads of their respective
governments.”42 Finally, there are “spontaneous” transgovernmental networks.43
Spontaneous transgovernmental networks arise without interstate agreement and
may either formalize themselves as transgovernmental regulatory organizations or
result from agreements among domestic regulatory agencies of two or more
states.44 As Slaughter notes, “[t]he last few decades have witnessed the emergence
of a vast network of such agreements effectively institutionalizing channels of
regulatory cooperation between specific countries. These agreements embrace
principles that can be implemented by the regulators themselves; they do not need
further approval by national legislators.”45
C.

An Assessment of Transgovernmental Relations Scholarship

The point of the foregoing discussion is not that interstate legal and regulatory
cooperation is not important (it is) nor that all significant legal and regulatory
cooperation is transgovernmental (it is not).46 Rather, the point is that there are at
least two basic ways that international legal and regulatory cooperation can be
structured—interstate and transgovernmental—and that exclusive reliance on the
traditional approach that is conceptually based on the former carries with it the risk
of neglecting the latter.47
The existing literature on transgovernmentalism has already gone a long way
toward helping scholars avoid this risk of overlooking transgovernmental forms of
international legal and regulatory cooperation. As noted above, this literature has

European regulators in called for by heads of state in the Transatlantic Declaration of 1990,
the New Transatlantic Agenda of 1995, and the Transatlantic Economic Partnership
agreement of 1998. Id. at 47.
42
Id. at 46-47.
43
Id. at 48-49.
44
Id. Examples of this type include the Basel Committee, the International Organization
of Securities Commissioners, and the International Network for Environmental Compliance
and Enforcement. Id. at 48.
45
Id. at 49.
46
SLAUGHTER, NEW WORLD ORDER, supra note 3, at 39; Raustiala, supra note 9, at 50.
47
There is, in fact, a third category of interactions that represent another form of
cooperation: transnational relations, defined as “regular interactions across national
boundaries when at least one actor is a non-state agent or does not operate on behalf of a
national government or an intergovernmental organization.” Thomas Risse-Kappen,
Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Introduction, in BRINGING TRANSNATIONAL
RELATIONS BACK IN: NON-STATE ACTORS, DOMESTIC STRUCTURES AND INTERNATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS 3 (Thomas Risse-Kappen ed., 1995). Among the nongovernmental actors that
are widely studied by scholars of transnational relations are nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs). See, e.g., MARGARET E. KECK AND KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND
BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998).
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provided a valuable concept for recognizing and analyzing transgovernmental
networks to complement the traditional concept of interstate cooperation.48
Moreover, the literature presents the advantages of transgovernmental networks
compared to interstate forms of cooperation. A fundamental advantage is that
transgovernmental networks may be able to solve global problems in a manner that
does not involve concentrating power in international organizations, power which
then might be abused.49 Moreover, “[networks] are fast, flexible, cheap, and
potentially more effective, accountable, and inclusive than existing international
institutions.”50
Raustiala adds that transgovernmental networks have the
advantages of fostering experimentation and innovation, and dispensing “the timeconsuming formality of traditional international organizations.”51
The literature has also begun to examine the consequences of the rise of
transgovernmental networks.
For example, Raustiala argues that
transgovernmental networks are “conduit[s] for the diffusion of regulatory ideas,
rules, and practices” that can lead to international policy convergence.52 Raustiala
also argues, along with Slaughter, that transgovernmental networks can improve
compliance with international law.53 Transgovernmental networks may also
contribute to world order by “increasing the scope, nature, and quality of
international cooperation.”54
In addition, the transgovernmentalism literature suggests a variety of reasons for
increases in transgovernmental interactions in general, including increased
48

See supra Part II.B.
SLAUGHTER, NEW WORLD ORDER, supra note 3, at 8-11. Slaughter argues that “we
need global rules without centralized power but with government actors who can be held to
account through a variety of political mechanisms. . . . Government networks can help
address [this] governance tri-lemma, offering a flexible and relatively fast way to conduct
the business of global governance, coordinating and even harmonizing national government
action while initiating and monitoring different solutions to global problems. Yet they are
decentralized and dispersed, incapable of exercising centralized coercive authority. Further,
they are government actors.” Id. at 10-11.
50
Slaughter, Global Economy, supra note 7, at 179-181. The claim regarding
accountability is controversial. For an example of a more skeptical take on the question of
network accountability, see, e.g., Ruth W. Grant & Robert O. Keohane, Accountability and
Abuses of Power in World Politics, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 29, 38-39 (2005). In her 2004
book, Slaughter acknowledges and responds to such accountability concerns, including the
charge that transgovernmental networks will result in technocratic governance by unelected
bureaucrats and the claim that transgovernmentalism distorts domestic political processes.
See Slaughter, Global Economy, supra note 7, at 181 and SLAUGHTER, NEW WORLD ORDER,
supra note 3, at chap. 6.
51
Raustiala, supra note 9, at 24.
52
Raustiala, supra note 9, at 51-70; see also SLAUGHTER, NEW WORLD ORDER, supra
note 3, at 171-177.
53
Raustiala, supra note 9, at 76-83; see also SLAUGHTER, NEW WORLD ORDER, supra
note 3, at 183-186.
54
SLAUGHTER, NEW WORLD ORDER, supra note 3, at 24 and 86-88.
49
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regulatory interdependence;55 the proliferation of functionally similar regulatory
agencies within states;56 increased levels of trade and resulting pressures for
regulatory harmonization to address non-tariff barrier concerns;57 increased
institutionalization of world politics;58 and technological change, which has made
transgovernmental cooperation both more desirable (since the involvement of
technically sophisticated government agencies can facilitate the regulation of issue
areas characterized by increasing technical complexity)59 and possible (since
technology provides the means of communication necessary for transgovernmental
cooperation).60 As Raustiala summarizes, “[i]n short, three core factors—
technological innovation, the expansion of domestic regulation, and the rise of
globalization—have promoted the development of networks.”61
These factors may help explain the overall rise of transgovernmentalism. These
factors, however, are general, macro-level phenomena and are therefore less useful
for explaining variations in levels of transgovernmentalism across different groups
of states and across different issue areas. This leaves important questions about the
form of international legal and regulatory cooperation largely unanswered. What
determines whether cooperation is likely to be transgovernmental or interstate?
Why is legal and regulatory cooperation among some states and in some issue areas
principally interstate, while among other states and in other issue areas it is
primarily transgovernmental? More generally, what accounts for varying levels of
transgovernmentalism across different groups of states and across different issue
areas? With some exceptions,62 legal scholars and political scientists have devoted
relatively little effort overall to finding answers to these questions, leaving a
55

Keohane & Nye, Transgovernmental Relations, supra note 8, at 41-42.
Raustiala, supra note 9, at 13.
57
Pollack & Shaffer, supra note 22, at 27; Raustiala, supra note 9, at 12.
58
ROBERT O. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE 210 (3d ed.
2001) [hereinafter KEOHANE & NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE]; Keohane & Nye,
Transgovernmental Relations, supra note 8, at 42 and 50; and Risse-Kappen, supra note 45,
at 30-31.
59
KEOHANE & NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE, supra note 58, at 210
60
Raustiala, supra note 9, at 12.
61
Raustiala, supra note 9, at 16.
62
For an example of earlier work that addresses this issue, see Part III of the 1971
special issue of International Organization on transnational relations, including the
introduction to that part. 25 INT’L ORG. 519-521 (1971). See also Keohane & Nye,
Transgovernmental Relations, supra note 8, at 55, and KEOHANE & NYE, POWER AND
INTERDEPENDENCE, supra note 58, at 271 and, generally, chap. 2 (noting that levels of
interdependence vary by issue area, and that these varying levels may in turn affect the level
of transnational and transgovernmental activity). For a recent example of work addressing
this issue, see Raustiala, supra note 9. Raustiala’s theory is based on the proposition that
incentives for interstate cooperation are lower when substantive regulatory differences are
large, regulators do not want to compromise their own domestic systems, or regulatory
power is highly asymmetric. In those cases, transgovernmentalism is a likely alternative
form of cooperation. Id. at 16, 72-76, and 88-89.
56
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significant gap in the literature on transgovernmental cooperation.
III. A RATIONAL DESIGN THEORY OF TRANSGOVERNMENTALISM
The primary goal of this article is to make a modest contribution toward filling
this gap. The article pursues this goal by developing a rational design theory of
transgovernmentalism aimed at explaining variations in levels of
transgovernmentalism across different groups of states and across different issue
areas. This part of the article proceeds in four steps to explain the theory. First, it
applies the theory of rational institutional design to the concept of
transgovernmental relations, framing interstate versus transgovernmental as a
design choice by heads of state and regulators. Second, it states some of the
preconditions for transgovernmental cooperation that the theory assumes have been
satisfied. Third, it identifies the theory’s dependent and explanatory variables.
Finally, this part uses the rational design theory of transgovernmentalism to derive
a series of conjectures about how the level of transgovernmentalism (the dependent
variable) is likely to be affected by distribution problems; preference heterogeneity;
enforcement problems; high politics; issue complexity; agency autonomy; and
antecedent interactions in interstate organizations (the explanatory variables).
A.

Transgovernmental versus Interstate as a Design Choice

This article applies rational institutional design theory to the concept of
transgovernmentalism in order to understand transgovernmental versus interstate
cooperation as a “design choice.” Two different types of “designers” may seek to
influence how cooperation is structured: (1) heads of state and other high-level
officials (such as foreign ministers), and the diplomats and lawyers who negotiate
on their behalf; and (2) regulatory agencies and individual regulators and
government lawyers acting autonomously from the first type of designers. For
efficiency of expression, the article will henceforth refer to these two types of
designers by using the terms “heads of state” and “regulators.” Simply stated, the
rational design theory of transgovernmentalism proposed in this article claims that
whether legal and regulatory cooperation is interstate or transgovernmental depends
largely on the rational choices of heads of state and regulators taking into account
the costs and benefits of the two forms of cooperation.63 This section first
63

This conceptualization implicitly assumes that heads of state and regulators are not
only the leading actors in international cooperation but also the leading designers of the
structures of international cooperation and that they are not influenced by other domestic
political factors. Moreover, in the context of delegation, this article conceptualizes the head
of state as the principal and the regulators as agents. Future research should involve relaxing
these simplifying assumptions. For example, in some cases domestic legislation might be
used to specify the form of cooperation, making the design preferences of legislative bodies
(as well as the preferences of interest groups that influence legislation) potentially significant
in addition to the preferences of heads of state and regulators. Moreover, in some issue areas
and in some states, it may be more accurate to conceptualize the legislature as the principal
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discusses the choice, then the designers.
1.

The Design Choice

Transgovernmental cooperation and interstate cooperation have different
attributes, and therefore different costs and benefits. The starting point for the
rational design theory of transgovernmentalism is the assumption that designers
consider these attributes in light of the problems they face, and make a rational
choice between the two approaches based on their relative costs and benefits.64
This approach is inspired by Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson and Duncan
Snidal’s recent work on the rational design of international institutions. Their
“basic strategy is to treat institutions as rational, negotiated responses to the
problems international actors face.”65 Like them, this article’s “basic presumption,
grounded in the broad tradition of rational-choice analysis, is that states use
international institutions to further their own goals, and they design institutions
accordingly.”66 This article also agrees with Koremenos et al. “that rational design
can explain much about institutions, but not everything,”67 and that not all
institutional design is the product of conscious design.68
The theory developed here, however, differs from Koremenos et al. in two
respects. First, while their approach is limited to explicitly agreed upon institutions
and excludes “tacit bargains and implicit guidelines,”69 this article extends the
argument of Koremenos et al. to transgovernmental networks, which often consist
of just these sorts of “tacit bargains and implicit guidelines.”70 This extension,
however, is consistent with Koremenos et al.’s logic of rational design. As they

who delegates functions to heads of state or regulators. Incorporating these considerations
into this article’s rational design logic would lead to a substantially more complex and
difficult analysis, but may yield additional insights.
64
Although this assumption makes intuitive sense, it should be noted that it is not
uncontroversial. Among other things, the deliberate efforts of “designers” are only one of a
variety of factors that influence how cooperation is structured. For an important critique of
the concept of “design” in the context of domestic constitutions, see Donald L. Horowitz,
Constitutional Design: An Oxymoron? 42 NOMOS 253 (2000). In addition, although the
rational choice approach is helpful for understanding transgovernmentalism, it is not the only
approach that can produce insights. Moreover, rational choice approaches have their own
limitations. For a critique of rational choice approaches in general, see DONALD P. GREEN &
IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY (1994). For a critique of the
rational institutional design approach, see Alexander Wendt, Driving with the Rearview
Mirror: On the Rational Science of Institutional Design, 55 INT’L ORG. 1019 (2001).
65
Barbara Koremenos et al., The Rational Design of Institutions, 55 INT’L ORG. 761, 768
(2001).
66
Id. at 762.
67
Id. at 763.
68
Id. at 766.
69
Id. at 762.
70
See infra Part II.B.
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point out, “[e]ven institutions that are not highly formalized and arise through
informal and evolutionary processes may embody significant rational design
principles.”71
2.

The Designers: Heads of State and Regulators

The second difference between this article’s rational design theory of
transgovernmentalism and the approach of Koremenos et al. relates to the actors
that influence the design of cooperative frameworks. Whereas Koremenos et al.
emphasize the role of states,72 the present article argues that the relevant
“designers” may also include regulators. There are three steps to this argument.
First, applying the concept of delegation, the head of state (the principal) is
distinguished from the regulator (the agent) to which the head of state delegates
regulatory functions.73 Second, regulators are assumed to be capable of acting
independently from heads of state.74 The extent of this autonomy varies and thus
the potential for agency slack (action by the agent that is neither authorized by the
principal nor within the scope of discretion granted to the agent by the principal)
also varies, depending on the extent and nature of the control mechanisms that the
principal has put in place.75 Agent autonomy may also vary depending on
asymmetrical expertise and information between the principal and agent.76
Third, it is assumed that the interests of regulators as agents may differ from the
interests of the head of state as principal. Specifically, the assumption is that
regulators may have their own preferences about the design of institutions. This
argument is consistent with one of the central propositions of principal-agent
71

Koremenos et al., supra note 65, at 767.
Id. at 763 (also considering the role of non-state actors).
73
On the concept of delegation and the principal-agent framework, see, e.g., PETER D.
FEAVER, ARMED SERVANTS: AGENCY, OVERSIGHT, AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS (2003);
D. RODERICK KIEWIET & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE LOGIC OF DELEGATION (1991); and
Arthur Lupia & Mathew D. McCubbins, Learning from Oversight: Fire Alarms and Police
Patrols Reconstructed, 10 J. LAW, ECON. & ORG. 96 (1994). For applications of the
principal-agent framework to world politics, see Daniel L. Nielson & Michael J. Tierney,
Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental
Reform, 57 INT’L ORG. 241 (2003) and Darren Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel Nielson, and
Michael J. Tierney, States, International Organizations, and Principal-Agent Theory, Nov.
16, 2004 (unpublished manuscript, available at http://mjtier.people.wm.edu/papers/lake.pdf).
74
This is a fundamental assumption of the principal-agent literature. See, e.g., KIEWIET
& MCCUBBINS, supra note 73, at 24.
75
Hawkins et al., supra note 73, at 8-9. These control mechanisms may include
specifying rules rather than granting discretion; establishing monitoring and reporting
requirements; carefully screening and selecting agents so that their preferences are as close
to the principal’s as possible; devising institutional checks and balances; and providing for
the imposition of sanctions in response to slack and rewards in the case of desired action. Id.
at 40-50; Nielson & Tierney, Delegation to International Organizations, supra note 73, at
246.
76
See, e.g., Lupia & McCubbins, supra note 73, at 100.
72
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theory, namely that the principal and agent each seek to maximize its interests,
leading to potential conflicts of interest between them, and that agents may behave
opportunistically.77 It also is supported by the core claim of transgovernmentalists
that the state “is disaggregating into its separate, functionally distinct parts.”78 If
these parts on their own initiative are able to cooperate with their foreign
counterparts, then they also should be able to influence the design of institutions for
that cooperation. Thus, the claim is that not only cooperation, but also decisionmaking about the design of cooperation, is disaggregating.
B.

Preconditions for Transgovernmental Legal and Regulatory Cooperation

This article’s rational design theory of transgovernmentalism assumes several
necessary conditions for transgovernmental cooperation have been met. First, it
assumes the necessary conditions for cooperation in general (such as the potential
for mutual gains) have been satisfied.79 The theory does not attempt to explain
cooperation in general. Rather, the theory takes cooperation as a given, and seeks
to explain the extent to which it is transgovernmental versus interstate.
Second, the theory assumes each of the states that are cooperating on an issue
has an agency or other governmental subunit with legal or regulatory functions
related to that issue. Since transgovernmental cooperation is, by definition,
cooperation at the level of governmental subunits, it is not possible unless all of the
cooperating states have such subunits in the relevant issue area. Closely related to
this is a third assumption, that the relevant agencies have the resources (for
example, staff and communications capabilities) enabling them to engage in
cooperation with agencies in other states.

77

KIEWIET & MCCUBBINS, supra note 73, at 5. As indicated by the italics at the
beginning of this paragraph, it bears emphasizing that the preferences of the principal and
agent regarding the design of cooperation are not necessarily inconsistent. For a much
stronger version of the assumption, consult public choice theory, which “assumes that
politicians, bureaucrats, and other decision-makers in public life are rationally selfinterested” and “attempt to maximize their personal power and wealth even when these
selfish ends conflict with public-spirited goals.” Jonathan R. Macey, The ‘demand’ for
international regulatory cooperation: a public-choice perspective, in TRANSATLANTIC
REGULATORY COOPERATION: LEGAL PROBLEMS AND POLITICAL PROSPECTS 149-151 (George
A. Bermann et al. eds., 2000). For a challenge to the assumption that bureaucrats are
necessarily opportunistic, see JOHN BREHM & SCOTT GATES, WORKING, SHIRKING AND
SABOTAGE (1997).
78
Slaughter, Real Order, supra note 5, at 184.
79
For example, cooperation will not arise under zero-sum situations since “one actor’s
loss is another’s gain;” nor will it arise in situations of harmony, in which case “there is no
reason to create a regime, because each individual player, acting without regard for the
behavior of others, maximizes both its own utility and that of the system as a whole.”
Stephen D. Krasner, Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto
Frontier, 43 WORLD POL. 336, 338 (1991).
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Dependent and Explanatory Variables

The rational design theory of transgovernmentalism seeks to explain the
conditions under which legal and regulatory cooperation is most likely to be
transgovernmental as opposed to interstate. In other words, the dependent variable
is transgovernmentalism. Moreover, the theory implies a variety of factors that
may influence designers’ choices regarding how to structure cooperation. These
factors, the theory’s explanatory variables, may help determine levels of
transgovernmentalism. These factors are the theory’s explanatory variables. This
section explains the dependent variable in more detail and briefly identifies the
explanatory variables.
1.

Dependent Variable: Transgovernmentalism

The dependent variable is transgovernmentalism. The variable’s purpose is to
measure the extent to which cooperation between two or more states on a given
issue is transgovernmental versus interstate. The concept of cooperation used in
this article is based on a standard definition:
Cooperation occurs when actors [which are not in pre-existent harmony]
adjust their behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences of others,
through a process of policy coordination. . . . [C]ooperation takes place when
the policies actually followed by one government are regarded by its partners
as facilitating realization of their own objectives, as the result of a process of
policy coordination.”80
This article emphasizes, however, that cooperation may include efforts to
coordinate behavior before the behavior actually takes place. That is, cooperation
includes not only changing policies after the fact, but also working together to
adjust policies during the policymaking process to ensure they are compatible in
the first place. Moreover, this article’s concept of cooperation explicitly includes
interactions between heads of state or regulators, even if they do not in fact result in
any observable policy changes, provided that these interactions directly relate to the
given issue area.81 The goal is to establish the existence of interstate and
transgovernmental structures for solving problems of mutual concern, not
necessarily their effectiveness in solving these problems.82

80

KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 20, at 51-52.
Even in situations where transgovernmental networks are “mere talking shops,” they
are important. As Slaughter points out, “[T]alk is the first prerequisite of information
exchange; in the process, trust is fostered, along with an awareness of common
enterprise. . . . Indeed, what sometimes starts as haphazard communication may lead officials
to recognize the need and opportunity for coordination, across the range of domestic
governmental concerns—from enforcement efforts to codes of best practices.” Anne-Marie
Slaughter, Everyday Global Governance, 132 DAEDALUS 83, 86-87 (2003).
82
Although this article focuses on the causes of transgovernmentalism, the consequences
of transgovernmentalism—including its effectiveness at solving problems of cooperation—
81
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Because of the difficulty of establishing a baseline with reference to which
absolute levels of interstate and transgovernmental cooperation could be assessed,
and because most areas of cooperation involve a mix of interstate and
transgovernmental cooperation,83 this article uses a measure that aims to assess the
relative levels of these two types of cooperation on a case-by-case basis. For
example, transgovernmentalism is low when cooperation is primarily interstate and
the level of transgovernmental cooperation is comparatively low; and high when
cooperation is primarily transgovernmental and the level of interstate cooperation is
comparatively low.
To determine levels of interstate and transgovernmental cooperation, the article
looks for three types of evidence. First, it determines whether there are agreements
or other formal documents between heads or state (interstate) or regulators
(transgovernmental) providing guidelines for cooperation on a given issue. These
documents are not only evidence of cooperation in the form of the negotiations
leading up to agreement, but also evidence of the relative levels of interstate and
transgovernmental cooperation intended by the parties. Second, the article seeks
quantitative data about interactions between heads of state and regulators in
connection with mutual problems in the issue area as one way of assessing the
actual levels of interstate versus transgovernmental cooperation. Third, the article
examines whether experts and practitioners from the cooperating parties
characterize cooperation as primarily interstate or transgovernmental.84
2.

Explanatory Variables

This article focuses on seven explanatory variables that may help explain
variations in levels of transgovernmentalism in legal and regulatory cooperation
across different groups of states and different issue areas: (1) distribution problems
(the extent of disagreement among actors about the preferred outcome when there
are multiple Pareto-optimal equilibria); (2) preference heterogeneity problems (the
extent to which divergence between actors’ fundamental preferences makes any
agreement in a given issue area difficult); (3) enforcement problems (the extent to
which actors have incentives to defect from a cooperative arrangement); (4) high
politics (whether the intended cooperation involves “high politics,” such as national
security or military issues, versus “low politics”); (5) issue complexity (complexity
constitutes another interesting and important research agenda.
83
Mark A. Pollack & Gregory C. Shaffer, Who Governs?, in Transatlantic Governance
in the Global Economy 287, 301 (Mark A. Pollack & Gregory C. Shaffer eds., 2001).
84
Although there are sources of empirical evidence that can be used to assess levels of
transgovernmentalism, classifying this level in a given situation as “low” or “high” is, of
course, a qualitative judgment. Therefore, the case study in Part IV of this article presents
the evidence in some detail so that the reader can critically evaluate judgments regarding the
level of transgovernmentalism, as well as judgments about the values of other variables. The
author acknowledges the formidable challenges associated with the operationalization of the
variables examined in this article, a challenge that must be addressed in further work on this
project.
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of the issue area in which states seek to cooperate); (6) agency autonomy (the
autonomy of regulators in a given issue area); and (7) antecedent interaction (the
extent of antecedent interactions among regulators in interstate organizations).85
These variables are explained in more detail in the conjectures that follow.
D.

Conjectures about the Determinants of Transgovernmentalism

In this section, a series of conjectures are derived from the rational design theory
of transgovernmentalism. Each of the conjectures contains a hypothesis about the
relationship between the dependent variable, transgovernmentalism, and one or
more of the explanatory variables.
The baseline for the conjectures is the assumption that transgovernmental
cooperation involves lower negotiating costs than interstate cooperation.86
Transgovernmentalism therefore can be considered the “default mode” of
cooperation before other costs and benefits are taken into account. One reason
interstate negotiating costs tend to be higher is they typically involve a higher level
of diplomatic formality, which consumes the time of heads of state and their staffs’
resources. When formal approval is needed within a state, as is often the case for
interstate institutions, the diplomatic formalities are compounded by domestic
political formalities.87 Transgovernmental networks, in contrast, are “fast, flexible

85

In some cases, such interactions—to the extent they involve work on specific issuerelated problems—may be tantamount to one of the types of transgovernmental networks
identified by Slaughter: networks within international organizations. See supra text
accompanying note 38. Therefore, this explanatory variable cannot be applied to Slaughter’s
first type of transgovernmental network—networks within international organizations—
without running the risk of circularity. In other cases, such interactions are an independent
factor that may facilitate future substantive interactions.
86
Lower sovereignty costs might be another reason to prefer transgovernmental to
interstate cooperation. However, since interstate institutions can be designed to minimize
sovereignty costs (see, e.g., Koremenos et al., supra note 65, at 771), sovereignty costs are
not included in this analysis. Moreover, it is possible that transgovernmental cooperation
could be more expensive in one way, namely higher agency costs. Delegation, however, can
be designed to mitigate these costs. See, e.g., Hawkins et al., supra note 73. Therefore,
although agency costs can never be eliminated in a principal-agent relationship, this article
does not consider agency costs to be a decisive factor in the choice between
transgovernmental and interstate cooperation.
87
Negotiation costs are likely to be especially high in the case of relatively legalized
interstate cooperation.
“[A]doption of a highly legalized agreement entails significant contracting costs. Any
agreement entails some negotiating costs-coming together, learning about the issue,
bargaining, and so forth—especially when issues are unfamiliar or complex. But these
costs are greater for legalized agreements. States normally exercise special care in
negotiating
and drafting legal agreements, since the costs of violation are higher. Legal specialists must
be consulted; bureaucratic reviews are often lengthy. Different legal traditions across states
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[and] cheap.”88 They “bypass a great deal of cumbersome and formal international
negotiating procedure”89 and typically involve a lower degree of legalization,
resulting in lower negotiating costs. Indeed, transgovernmental networks can be
created almost spontaneously.90 As Slaughter notes, the use of “memoranda of
understanding” (MOUs) and even less formal methods of agreement allow
transgovernmental interaction to expand quickly, in contrast to the “lethargic pace”
of traditional treaty negotiations.91
Conjectures 1 and 2 discuss conditions under which the benefits of interstate
cooperation may outweigh these general benefits of transgovernmental cooperation,
leading to lower levels of transgovernmentalism. There are situations in which
there may be compelling reasons for the designers of cooperation to prefer
interstate cooperation notwithstanding the advantages of transgovernmentalism. In
contrast, conjectures 3, 4 and 5 discuss conditions under which there may be
advantages of transgovernmental cooperation that are specific to a given group of
states or a given issue area. These advantages go beyond the baseline advantages
discussed above and are likely to increase levels of transgovernmentalism.
Conjecture 1: Transgovernmentalism decreases as distribution, preference
heterogeneity or enforcement problems increase.
Coordination, distribution, preference heterogeneity and enforcement problems
are among the problems that actors may face when seeking gains from cooperation.
Both transgovernmental and interstate structures of cooperation can be designed to
facilitate cooperation under conditions characterized by simple coordination
problems. Under such conditions, actors are likely to prefer transgovernmentalism
because, as discussed above, it generally is less costly than interstate cooperation.
However, interstate institutions generally can be designed to mitigate distribution,
preference heterogeneity, and enforcement problems more effectively than
transgovernmental structures of cooperation. Therefore, when any of these three
types of problems exist, actors are, ceteris paribus, more likely to prefer interstate
than transgovernmental cooperation. Drawing on game theory, the following
discussion explains coordination, distribution, preference heterogeneity, and
enforcement problems, as well as possible institutional solutions and their
relevance to levels of transgovernmentalism.
Simple coordination problems exist when (1) the players need to coordinate their
policies in order to avoid a mutually undesirable outcome; (2) there are multiple

complicate the exercise. Approval and ratification processes, typically involving legislative
authorization, are more complex than for purely political agreements.”
Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54
INT’L ORG 421, 434-436 (2000).
88
Slaughter, Global Economy, supra note 7, at 179.
89
Id. at 180. See also Raustiala, supra note 9, at 24.
90
See SLAUGHTER, NEW WORLD ORDER, supra note 3, at 48-49 (describing spontaneous
government networks).
91
Id. at 49.
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Pareto optimal equilibria (that is, there is more than one policy alternative around
which the players can agree to coordinate that represents an equilibrium and has the
property that no other alternative can make either player better off without making
the other player worse off);92 and (3) the players are indifferent as to which Pareto
optimal policy is agreed upon.93
Figure 1: Simple Coordination Problem94
Coffee House
Bar
Coffee House
1
0
1
0
Bar
0
1
0
1
A “Simple Coordination Problem” game is depicted in Figure 1. In this game,
the two players are friends who wish to meet for a discussion. They can either
meet at the coffee house for a cup of coffee, or the bar for a glass of beer. The
choices available to one friend—referred to as the “row player”—are depicted in
the rows (first row coffee house, second row bar) and the row player’s preferences
are represented by the “payoffs” in lower-left corner of each cell of Figure 1. The
other friend is the “column player” whose payoffs are in the upper-right corner of
each cell. The important point is that each friend’s payoff depends not only on his
or her own choice, but also on the choice of the other. If the row player goes to the
bar but the column player goes to the coffee house (or vice versa), they cannot have
their discussion—the payoff for both friends is zero, as shown in the lower-left and
upper-right cells. If both friends, however, go to the coffee house or if they both go
to the bar, each player gets a payoff of one, indicating they prefer that situation
because they are able to have their discussion.95 The coordination problem faced

92

One outcome “Pareto dominates” another outcome if all players are at least as well off,
but at least one player is better off, with the first outcome rather than the second. An
outcome is “Pareto optimal” if there is no other outcome that Pareto dominates it. In other
words, when an outcome is Pareto optimal, there is no alternative outcome that can make
any player better off without making another player worse off (i.e., the outcome cannot be
improved without hurting at least one player). An outcome is “Pareto sub-optimal” if it is
not Pareto optimal, i.e., if an alternative outcome does exist that can make a player better off
without making any other player worse off. HERBERT GINTIS, GAME THEORY EVOLVING 28
(2000); RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 91 (1982). An equilibrium in two-player
games such as those referred to in this article is “a pair of strategies, each of which is a best
response to the other; i.e., each gives the player using it the highest possible payoff, given
the other player’s strategy.” GINTIS at 6.
93
Krasner, supra note 79, at 338-339; Hawkins et al., supra note 73, at 20; Lisa L.
Martin & Beth A. Simmons, Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions,
INT’L ORG. 729, 744 (1998).
94
This problem is illustrated in Krasner, supra note 79, at 338-339, using a different
scenario.
95
Id.
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by the two friends is a relatively simple one: they merely need to agree on where to
meet. In the language of game theory, they need to identify a “focal point” for
coordination.96
Figure 2: Battle of the Sexes97
Coffee House
Bar
Coffee House
3
0
2
0
Bar
0
2
0
3
The “Battle of the Sexes” game depicted in Figure 2 is also a coordination game,
but it adds a distribution problem. In the Battle of the Sexes: (1) the players
(traditionally depicted as a male and a female) again need to coordinate their
policies in order to avoid a mutually undesirable outcome (the lower-left or upperright cells, which do not provide any payoffs); (2) again, there are multiple Pareto
optimal equilibria; that is, there is more than one outcome—the upper-left cell and
the lower-right cell—that represents an equilibrium and has the property that no
other alternative can make either player better off without making the other player
worse off;98 but (3) the players are no longer indifferent as to which Pareto optimal
policy is agreed upon: as the payoffs indicate, the column player would prefer to
meet at the coffee house whereas the row player would prefer the bar.99
This third point is what introduces a distribution problem, and this is what
distinguishes the Battle of the Sexes from the Simple Coordination Problem. The
distribution of the payoffs favor the column player if the meeting is at the coffee
house and the row player if the meeting is at the bar. In either case, they both get
some payoff since they get to have their discussion, but since they are not
indifferent to the meeting place, they will have to negotiate where to meet. The
problem is not—as was the case in the Simple Coordination Problem—merely to
coordinate on a Pareto optimal outcome in order to avoid a Pareto sub-optimal
outcome that neither player desires. Now the problem is to resolve a conflict of
interests regarding which Pareto-optimal outcome to select. Ordinarily, this is a
more difficult problem to solve than simple coordination and, as explained below,
one that interstate structures generally are better able to mitigate than
transgovernmentalism.

96

Martin & Simmons, supra note 93, at 744.
This game is illustrated in Krasner, supra note 79, at 339-340, using a different
scenario.
98
A move from the upper-left to the lower-right cell would make the row player better
off by increasing her payoff from 2 to 3, but it would make the column player worse off by
reducing his payoff from 3 to 2 (and vice versa). The lower-left and upper-right cells make
both players worse off.
99
Krasner, supra note 79, at 339-340; Martin & Simmons, supra note 93, at 744.
97
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Figure 3: Preference Heterogeneity100

a’ SQ a p
b
b’
An even more difficult cooperation problem can be posed by preference
heterogeneity. A preference heterogeneity problem exists when two states cannot
agree on cooperation due to fundamentally different preferences. For example, in
the one dimensional policy space depicted in Figure 3, states A and B may have
ideal points a and b, respectively. These points are different, indicating preference
heterogeneity. However, the status quo (indicated by point SQ) lies outside (in this
case, to the left of) the range bounded by the two states’ ideal points. This means
that even though A and B have different preferences, they can both move closer to
their ideal points by agreeing to move the status quo to the right, say to some point
p that lies somewhere between point a and a plus the distance between SQ and a.
Under these circumstances, A and B would both prefer such an agreement instead
of the status quo.
However, as the two states’ ideal points diverge (say, to points a’ and b’)—
representing increased preference heterogeneity—the status quo may lie between
the two states’ ideal points. In such a case, A would reject any proposal to the right
of SQ because this would be farther from A’s ideal point, and B would reject any
proposal to the left of SQ because this would be farther from B’s ideal point. Thus,
A and B will have little if any incentive to negotiate with each other, making
cooperation unlikely.101 In the Simple Coordination Problem and Battle of the
Sexes games, there is at least a possibility of agreeing to a solution that overcomes
barriers to Pareto-improvement. The lesson of Figure 3, however, is that high
levels of preference heterogeneity and the configuration of ideal points relative to
the status quo may preclude agreement.
Figure 4: Prisoners’ Dilemma
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Even if coordination, distribution and preference heterogeneity problems are
overcome and an agreement is reached on the terms of cooperation, there may be
enforcement problems that make it difficult to sustain cooperation over time.
Enforcement problems exist when individual actors have incentives to defect from
an agreement.102 One way of understanding enforcement problems is by
100

This figure and the discussion is generally based on the earlier version of Hawkins et
al., supra note 73, dated December 4, 2003, at 42 (on file with the editors).
101
This discussion is substantially based on id. at 40-41.
102
Koremenos et al., supra note 65, at 776.
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considering the implications of another game, the “Prisoners’ Dilemma.” In this
game, the two players are being held in a prison pending trial for a crime. They are
being interrogated in separate rooms and cannot communicate. The prosecutor has
only enough evidence to convict the prisoners of misdemeanors and keep them in
prison for one year. Therefore, if neither prisoner provides information to the
prosecutor—that is, if the prisoners cooperate with each other—their sentences will
both be relatively light, represented by the payoffs of 3 in the upper-left cell.
However, if one of the prisoners defects by confessing and providing the prosecutor
with incriminating evidence about the other prisoner, the prosecutor will drop all
charges against the defecting prisoner and set her free—but, armed with the
additional evidence, the prosecutor will now be able to convict the non-confessing
prisoner of a felony and send him to jail for ten years. For example, as shown by
the payoffs in the lower-left cell, if the row player defects but the column player
cooperates, the row player gets a payoff of 4 (the best possible outcome for her) but
the column player gets a payoff of only 1 (the worst possible outcome for him). If
both prisoners confess—that is, if they both defect—they will each get eight years
in jail (ten years for the crime, less two years for confessing), represented by the
payoffs of 2 in the lower-right cell.103
In the Prisoner’s dilemma, each player’s dominant strategy is to defect. This is
because regardless of the column player’s move, the row player will get a higher
payoff by defecting; and regardless of the row player’s move, the column player
will get a higher payoff by defecting. Therefore, the only equilibrium is in the
lower-right cell (defect, defect).104 The dilemma is that in the lower-right cell both
players get a relatively low payoff of 2—an outcome that is not Pareto optimal
because there is another outcome, cooperate-cooperate in the upper-left cell, that
could make both players better off. One way of resolving the dilemma might be an
agreement by the prisoners to cooperate with each other, and this is one reason why
states in Prisoners’ Dilemma situations often seek international rules designed to
restrain defection.105 But why should states be expected to comply with such rules
when their dominant strategy is to defect? Unlike the Simple Coordination
Problem and the Battle of the Sexes in which the payoffs are 0 for both players if
either defects, in the Prisoners’ Dilemma the row player can increase her payoff
from 3 to 4 by defecting (as can the column player), creating incentives to defect.

103

For accounts of the prisoner’s dilemma game, see GINTIS, supra note 92 at 19,
Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International
Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT’L L. 335, 358-360 (1989); and KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra
note 20, at 68-69.
104
Abbott explains this result in terms of offensive and defensive incentives.
Offensively, each player wants to get the maximum payoff of 4, which can only happen if
she defects. Defensively, each player wants to avoid the so-called “sucker’s payoff” of 1,
which can only happen if he cooperates. Abbott, supra note 103, at 359.
105
Id.
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This is the enforcement problem.
It is important to note, however, that the conclusion that defection is the
dominant strategy in the Prisoners’ Dilemma game depends on the assumption that
the game is played only once or a small number of times. In an iterated Prisoners’
Dilemma game—that is, when the game is played repeatedly by the same players—
the players may find it rational to cooperate instead.107 This is, as Keohane
explains, because “in multiple-play Prisoners’ Dilemma, defection is in the long
run unrewarding, since the short-run gains thereby obtained will normally be
outweighed by the mutual punishment that will ensue over the long run,” including
retaliatory defection by other players in future iterations of the game.108 Therefore,
enforcement problems generally are not as serious in iterated or ongoing
interactions as they are in single isolated interactions. On the other hand, if the
players do not sufficiently value the future gains of cooperation—that is, if the
“shadow of the future” is not long enough—cooperation might not be
sustainable.109
Finally, in addition to iteration, depth of cooperation may affect the seriousness
of enforcement problems. According to George Downs, David Rocke and Peter
Barsoom, “depth of cooperation” refers to “the extent to which [an agreement]
requires states to depart from what they would have done in its absence.”110 They
argue that the greater the depth of cooperation, the higher the magnitude of
enforcement that will be necessary to prevent defection.111
How can actors mitigate the problems of coordination, distribution, preference
heterogeneity and enforcement that create barriers to cooperation? Returning to
Figure 1, the Simple Coordination Problem suggests that coordination problems are
relatively easy to solve if they do not also involve distribution problems. The
players simply need to establish a focal point for coordination. A basic tool of
transgovernmentalism such as an informal memorandum of understanding could be
used to accomplish this. There is no need for an enforcement mechanism to ensure
that the players don’t break from the agreed-upon focal point. Because the players
in Figure 1 have no disagreement between the upper-left (coffee house, coffee
house) and lower-right (bar, bar) outcomes, and because these outcomes are both
Pareto optimal (in this game, none of the other outcomes can make either player
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Or, using Abbot’s terminology, the offensive and defensive incentives to defect that
are created by the payoff structure “pull inexorably toward non-cooperation.” Id. at 362.
107
KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 20, at 75-76; Abbott, supra note 103, at
363.
108
KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 20, at 75; Abbott, supra note 103, at 363.
This outcome was demonstrated by ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION
(1984).
109
Koremenos et al., supra note 65, at 781.
110
George W. Downs et al., Is the Good News about Compliance Good News about
Cooperation?, 50 INT’L ORG. 379, 383 (1996).
111
Id.
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better off), there is no incentive for either player to defect.112 Under these
conditions, the more costly alternative of interstate cooperation will be “overkill”
and transgovernmentalism will be more likely.
In contrast, interstate structures of cooperation generally can be better designed
than transgovernmental structures to mitigate the other three types of problems:
distribution, preference heterogeneity and enforcement problems.
Most
importantly, the scope of issues covered by an interstate institution may be
increased to allow issue linkage. Issue linkage can facilitate compromises across
issue areas when preference heterogeneity or distribution problems might otherwise
preclude cooperation. In the case of preference heterogeneity, imagine that in
addition to the policy space represented by Figure 3 there are other issue areas in
which the actors are attempting to coordinate policies. Even if state A’s ideal point
is a’, A may be willing to agree to a coordination point that is to the right of the
status quo and therefore farther from its ideal point but closer to B’s ideal point b’,
provided that in the second issue area state B agrees to a coordination point that is
closer to A’s ideal point. More generally, if state A values the second issue more
than the first, and state B values the first issue more than the second, “both can be
made better off by exchange, that is, by agreeing to defer to each other on these
issues.”113 Thus, by linking together two or more issue areas, the parties may be
able to reach agreement even when one or more individual issue areas are
characterized by a high degree of preference heterogeneity. For this reason, the
issue scope of rationally designed cooperative arrangements is likely to increase
with greater preference heterogeneity.114
The same solution can be used to address distribution problems. In the Battle of
the Sexes game depicted in Figure 2, imagine that after their meeting the friends
wish to go to a movie, that they would rather spend time together at the same movie
than see separate movies, but that one friend prefers to see a comedy and the other
a drama. By linking together the coffee house-bar and comedy-drama issues, it
may be easier to reach an agreement—one friend gets her preference for the bar in
exchange for the other friend getting his preference for the comedy—than if the
issues were treated separately. Therefore, the issue scope of rationally designed
cooperative arrangements is likely to increase with the severity of distribution
problems.115 In summary, to use Keohane’s words, by linking issues under an
interstate institution, “more potential quids are available for the quo.” This can
help mitigate both interest heterogeneity and distribution problems.116

112
Krasner, supra note 79, at 338. For example, if the players agree on the coffee house
(upper-left cell), neither player can get a higher payoff by going to the bar instead.
113
Koremenos et al., supra note 65, at 786.
114
Id. at 785-786.
115
Id. at 786.
116
KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 20, at 91. Or, as Koremenos et al. explain,
“[l]inkage . . . may allow [actors] to overcome distributional obstacles. When the benefits of
an issue accrue primarily to a few, and the costs fall disproportionately on others, linkage to
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In addition, increasing the scope of issues covered by an institution may help
solve enforcement problems. As noted above, in a Prisoners’ Dilemma situation,
iteration over time can mitigate enforcement problems by altering incentives to
defect. As Kenneth Abbott explains, “[c]ooperation can also emerge and be
maintained through ‘horizontal’ iteration—the linkage of different issue areas. . . .
[L]inkage makes it possible for states to respond to cooperation or defection in one
area with appropriate actions in another, much as in an iterated game.”117 In other
words, even if two actors reach an agreement for coordinating a policy in an issue
area, cooperation will be difficult to sustain if one of the actors later comes to value
the benefits of defection in the present over the costs of defection in terms of lost
benefits of cooperation in the future. However, if this first issue area is linked to a
second issue area, such that if an actor defects from cooperation on one issue area
then the other actor will automatically defect from cooperation on the second one,
the costs of the first party’s defection is now higher: it includes not only lost future
cooperation in the first issue area, but also lost future cooperation in the second
one. By increasing the total costs of defection, issue linkage can reduce net
incentives to defect, at least partially mitigating the enforcement problem.118
Therefore, the issue scope of rationally designed cooperative arrangements is likely
to be higher when enforcement problems are more severe.119
In addition to linking multiple issue areas, interstate institutions can be designed
to mitigate enforcement problems by providing centralized enforcement
mechanisms. This can be accomplished by delegating enforcement powers to a
third party. For example, the third party might be empowered to punish defectors
by withholding financial resources or imposing reputation costs. When multiple
issues are linked, the third party might be empowered to expel an actor who defects
on one issue from the entire cooperative arrangement. Moreover, the third party
might be empowered to monitor compliance, making it less likely that defection
will go undetected.120 Thus, centralized enforcement mechanisms like these can
decrease the likelihood of defection by increasing the likely costs of defection.
Because centralization is a way of mitigating enforcement problems, rationally
designed cooperative arrangements are likely to have higher centralization when
another issue with different distributional consequences allows cost-bearing states to be
compensated by those who reap the gains. When each state cares relatively more about one
of two issues, linking the negotiations may be the mutually preferred option. In particular,
the more each state cares about ‘its’ issue, the more essential linkage becomes in an
agreement.” Koremenos et al., supra note 65, at 786.
117
Abbott, supra note 103, at 363.
118
Koremenos et al., supra note 65, at 787; KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 20,
at 103. For example, “[t]he United States might be unable to resist domestic pressures to
impose tariffs on European wine, for example, were it not for the realization that such action
would invite retaliation from the Europeans on U.S. beef.” Koremenos et al., supra note 65,
at 797.
119
Koremenos et al, supra note 65, at 786-787.
120
Id. at 790.
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enforcement problems are more severe.121
Transgovernmental networks, however, generally cannot offer these solutions to
distribution, preference heterogeneity and enforcement problems to the same extent
as interstate institutions. First, while the issue scope of interstate institutions is
variable by design, transgovernmental networks will usually be limited to a single
issue area. This is because transgovernmentalism typically involves interactions
between specialized regulatory agencies, which themselves are not likely to deal
with multiple issue areas.122 Second, transgovernmental networks typically are not
centralized. When transgovernmental networks do exhibit some degree of
centralization, as is the case with transgovernmental regulatory organizations such
as the Basel Committee, they usually do not involve delegation of enforcement
powers.123
Therefore, when distribution, preference heterogeneity and
enforcement problems are serious, rational designers may find that formal interstate
institutions—particularly those creating issue linkage and centralization—are likely
to be worth the higher costs of negotiating interstate structures of cooperation.124
In contrast, if there are only simple coordination problems, rational designers are
likely to find that transgovernmentalism is a more cost-effective form of
cooperation.
Conjecture 2: Transgovernmentalism decreases as high politics increases.
“High politics” typically is defined as dealing with military and national security

121

Id. at 789-790.
In theory, almost any issue area can be divided into sub-issues, which raises the
possibility of sub-issue linkage in transgovernmental networks. For example, although the
case study in this article focuses on E.U.-U.S. merger review cooperation, it is possible that
this cooperation could be linked to cooperation on other sub-issue areas within the more
general issue area of antitrust. This conjecture does not take the possibility of sub-issue
linkage into account. However, additional case studies may show that this conjecture needs
to be modified to consider this type of issue linkage within transgovernmental networks.
123
SLAUGHTER, NEW WORLD ORDER, supra note 3, at 48. Other examples of
transgovernmental regulatory organizations identified by Slaughter include the International
Organization of Securities Commissioners and International Network for Environmental
Compliance and Enforcement. Id. As Slaughter notes, “Nothing [transgovernmental
regulatory organizations] do purports to be legally binding on the members, and there
typically are few or no mechanisms for formal enforcement or implementation.” Id. This is
not surprising, since heads of state are unlikely to allow regulators to delegate enforcement
functions to a third party that could then be used against the state.
124
This is not to say that transgovernmental networks offer no solutions to these
problems whatsoever. To the contrary, they can foster iteration by regularizing interactions
between different states’ regulators, which may help solve Prisoners’ Dilemmas. See
AXELROD, supra note 108 and KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 20. Moreover, they
may facilitate communication, and increased quantity and symmetry of information, which
also may help mitigate these problems. Id. However, the point remains that interstate
solutions generally will be able to mitigate distribution, preference heterogeneity and
enforcement problems more effectively and thus are more likely to be preferred by rational
designers of cooperation when these problems exist.
122
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matters, whereas “low politics” refers to other issue areas such as trade or the
environment.125 This conjecture is based on the assumption that heads of state are
less likely to surrender direct control over matters of high politics than over matters
of low politics.126 This conjecture is not meant to suggest that there is no
transgovernmental interaction in high politics. To the contrary, even in areas of
high politics cooperation is often necessary between governmental subunits of
different states.127
Consistent with this article’s definition of
transgovernmentalism as the level of transgovernmental cooperation relative to the
level of interstate cooperation within a given group of states in a given issue
area,128 most cooperation—including cooperation on matters of high politics—is
likely to involve a mix of interstate and transgovernmental interaction. When high
politics is involved, however, levels of interstate cooperation are likely to be higher
due to heads of states’ insistence on tighter control, making the relative level of
transgovernmental cooperation lower than when only low politics is involved.
Conjecture 3: Transgovernmentalism increases as issue complexity increases.
Transgovernmentalism is especially likely when high levels of expertise are
necessary to understand and formulate policy in a given issue area.129 Regulatory
agencies are specialized by design, and within agencies expertise often is even
more narrowly defined by methodology and profession.130 Even when heads of
state wish to be involved in an issue, they are likely to call on regulatory specialists
to “ameliorate the uncertainties and help them understand the current issues and
anticipate future trends” in complex areas such as monetary, macroeconomic,
technological, environmental, health and population matters.131 An issue area may
125
KEOHANE & NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE, supra note 58, at 20 (explaining the
distinction as associated with realist international relations theory).
126
See, e.g., Introduction, 25 INT’L ORG. 519, 520 (1971); Raustiala, supra note 9, at 5
(“[s]ome critics argue that . . . networks may arise only in areas of ‘low politics’”). The
high-low politics distinction has been subject to substantial criticism. See, e.g., KEOHANE &
NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE, supra note 58, at 20-23 and Nye & Keohane,
Transnational Relations, supra note 8, at 728-729 (1971). Because the distinction retains
significant currency among international relations scholars, this article nevertheless includes
this conjecture in order to subject it to eventual empirical assessment.
127
For example, consider cooperation between national militaries and defense
bureaucracies in the context of interstate collective security arrangements such as the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization.
128
See infra text accompanying notes 80 to 84.
129
KEOHANE & NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE, supra note 58, at 210. Hawkins et
al. make a similar point about delegation in general. Supra note 73, at 18.
130
For example, the FTC has several divisions, including the Bureau of Competition,
which deals with antitrust. Within the Bureau of Competition, there is a subunit dealing with
merger review.
For an organizational chart of the Bureau, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/bcorgchart.pdf. Merger review specialists include, among others,
professional economists and lawyers.
131
Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy
Coordination, 46 INT’L ORG. 1, 12-13 (Winter 1992). Actors may also desire flexibility in
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be intrinsically complex for reasons of technology, methodology, or professional
specialization, or it may be complex because of differences between national
regulatory systems that make coordination highly complicated.
Conjecture 4: Transgovernmentalism increases as agency autonomy increases.
The more autonomy a legal or regulatory agency possesses in a given issue area
or a given state, the more likely the agency is to engage in transgovernmental
cooperation on the issue with foreign counterparts. This conjecture is based on two
assumptions. The first assumption is that regulators prefer transgovernmental
cooperation to interstate cooperation. This is because regulators are able to act
more independently and with less direct supervision in transgovernmental
cooperation than in interstate cooperation.132 Almost all regulatory agencies are
subject to control mechanisms which significantly limit agency autonomy.
Interstate cooperation, however, implies even more expansive control mechanisms
and lower degrees of autonomy because heads of state are likely to supervise more
closely regulators on issues that heads of state are directly engaged in. Moreover,
in interstate cooperation, the regulators frequently “stay home” waiting for
instructions from high-level leaders about how to conduct their domestic regulatory
activities. In contrast, in transgovernmental networks, regulators interact directly
with their counterparts abroad without any necessary increase in supervision from
heads of state.133
It is one thing for regulators to prefer transgovernmentalism as the first
assumption states, but it is another thing for them to be able to actually engage in
transgovernmentalism. The second assumption is that in order to engage in
transgovernmental cooperation, regulators must either be directed to do so by the
head of state or have sufficient autonomy to engage in transgovernmental
cooperation on their own initiative.134
Given that regulators prefer
issue areas where high levels of complexity lead to uncertainty. See Koremenos et al., supra
note 65, at 778 and 793 (hypothesizing that states are likely to design more flexible
institutions when there is uncertainty about the state of the world). While transgovernmental
cooperation generally is more flexible than interstate, interstate cooperation can be designed
to be flexible. See id. (discussing how interstate institutions can be designed to be flexible as
a response to uncertainty). Therefore, this article does not include flexibility as a key
consideration.
132
As one U.S. government official put it, regulators are often afraid that high level
involvement can mean the “kiss of death” for their informal yet productive interactions with
their counterparts abroad. Presentation of Peter Secor, Deputy Director, Office of European
Union and Regional Affairs, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of
State, to the Seminar on Transatlantic Relations, Duke University (Mar. 22, 2004).
133
This type of direct interaction between government subunits is the essence of
transgovernmentalism. Many examples of transgovernmental interactions are documented in
SLAUGHTER, supra note 3, including transgovernmental interactions among regulators
(chapter 1), judges (chapter 2) and legislators (chapter 3).
134
Autonomy is “the range of potential independent action available to an agent after the
principal has established mechanisms of control.” Hawkins et al., supra note 73, at 8-9.
Control mechanisms may include specifying rules rather than granting discretion;
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transgovernmentalism, they are likely to use the full extent of their autonomy to
pursue transgovernmental cooperation even if they are not directed by the head of
state to do so. Therefore, this conjecture expects levels of transgovernmentalism to
increase as agency autonomy increases.
Conjecture 5: Transgovernmentalism increases as the extent of prior interactions
among regulators in international organizations increases.
This conjecture is based on the assumption that transgovernmental cooperation is
more likely when regulators already have been interacting with each other in
interstate institutions. In other words, transgovernmental cooperation is more
likely to emerge in issue areas where interstate institutions already exist. Keohane
and Nye’s early work on transgovernmentalism emphasized the importance of the
institutional context of transgovernmental relations, noting that international
organizations facilitate contact among domestic regulatory officials, and that
transgovernmental behavior is likely to be “particularly important in issue areas in
which functionally defined international organizations operate”.135 Recently,
Thomas Risse has gone further, arguing that “[t]he emergence of
transgovernmental coalitions seems to be almost entirely a function of highly
cooperative and institutionalized interstate relationships.”136
To summarize the conjectures, transgovernmentalism, being less costly than
interstate cooperation, is more likely when simple coordination problems are the
only barriers to cooperation. However, levels of transgovernmentalism are likely to
be lower when distribution, preference heterogeneity or enforcement problems are
more serious and in issue areas involving high politics. Transgovernmentalism is
likely to be higher when issue complexity, agency autonomy, and antecedent
regulatory interactions in interstate organizations are higher.
IV. THE CASE OF E.U.-U.S. MERGER REVIEW COOPERATION
In Part III, this article developed a rational design theory of
transgovernmentalism aimed at explaining variations in levels of
transgovernmentalism across different issue areas and different groups of states.
Part III then used the theory to derive a series of conjectures about seven variables
that are likely to affect levels of transgovernmentalism: distribution, preference
heterogeneity and enforcement problems; high politics; complexity; agency

establishing monitoring and reporting requirements; carefully screening and selecting agents
so that their preferences are as close to the principal’s as possible; devising institutional
checks and balances; and providing for the imposition of sanctions in response to slack and
rewards in the case of desired action. Id. at 40-50; Nielson & Tierney, supra note 73, at 246.
135
Keohane & Nye, Transgovernmental Relations, supra note 8, at 42 and 50.
136
Risse-Kappen, supra note 47, at 30-31. As noted above, in some cases, such
interactions—to the extent they involve work on specific issue-related problems—may be
tantamount to one type of network identified by Slaughter: transgovernmental networks
within international organizations. In other cases, such interactions are an independent
factor that may facilitate future substantive interactions.
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autonomy; and prior regulatory interactions in interstate organizations.
Part IV of the article uses the case of European Union (E.U.)137-United States
(U.S.) cooperation on antitrust issues to subject the rational design theory of
transgovernmentalism to a preliminary empirical plausibility test.138 More
specifically, this part focuses on merger review cooperation between the E.U. and
U.S. Part IV first provides a brief overview of antitrust (or competition) policy in
general and merger review in particular, with an emphasis on E.U. and U.S. law
and practice. It then assesses the extent of interstate and transgovernmental
cooperation in order to measure the level of transgovernmentalism in E.U.-U.S.
merger review cooperation. Third, Part IV examines each of the seven explanatory
variables described in the conjectures of Part III.

137
The E.U. arguably satisfies the criteria for a state under the traditional international
legal definition. See supra note 1. However, the E.U. is commonly considered to be a supranational institution. In either case, E.U.-U.S. cooperation is appropriate for this study
because of the E.U.’s competence in global antitrust issues. See infra text at notes 116-117.
Since transgovernmental versus interstate refers to the organizational level at which
cooperation takes place, it can be descriptive not only of states, but also other hierarchical
institutions. In the case of the E.U., the president of the European Council (and, in certain
cases, the president of the Commission) is the primary actor at the interstate level, and
Commission staff members are the main actors at the transgovernmental level. See Pollack
& Shaffer, supra note 22, at 23. Current members of the E.U. are Austria, Belgium, Cyprus,
the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The E.U.’s principal
institutions include the European Parliament, which represents the E.U.’s citizens and is
directly elected by them; the Council of the European Union, which represents the individual
member states; and the European Commission, which seeks to uphold the interests of the
Union as a whole.
For an overview of the E.U., visit EUROPA, at
http://europa.eu.int/institutions/index_en.htm. Until the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht, which
established the European Union, the E.U. was referred to as the European Community. See
generally
“The
History
of
the
European
Union,”
at
http://europa.eu.int/abc/history/index_en.htm. An overview of the history, institutions and
activities of the E.U. is available at the E.U.’s web site at http://europa.eu.int/index_en.htm.
138
Because it relies on only a single case study, this analysis cannot serve as more than a
preliminary plausibility test of the rational design theory of transgovernmentalism. See, e.g.,
GARY KING, ROBERT O. KEOHANE & SIDNEY VERBA, DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY: SCIENTIFIC
INFERENCE IN QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 211 (1994) (noting the limitations of single case
studies). More rigorous testing will require increasing the number of cases and reducing the
number of explanatory variables. Id. at 118-122. Additional cases would need to be selected
according to a carefully developed case selection strategy in order to mitigate selection bias.
Id. at chap. 4. Finally, improvements need to be made in the operationalization of concept of
transgovernmentalism and of the explanatory variables, improvement that will depend on
further theoretical and empirical work. Therefore, the theory remains preliminary and the
conjectures tentative.
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Overview of Competition Policy and Merger Review

Competition policy involves the regulation of business arrangements that hinder
economic competition. One branch of competition regulation is merger review,
which involves the evaluation of proposed business combinations to determine
whether the combinations are likely to have anticompetitive effects. A merger can,
in essence, turn two formerly competing companies into a single company, thus
reducing competition. Generally speaking, merger regulators will disapprove a
merger if the surviving company is not likely to face significant competition after
the proposed merger.139
1.

Merger Review in the E.U.

In the E.U., competition policy is enforced by the Directorate General for
Competition (DGC) of the European Commission.140 The E.U. derives its merger
review authority from a regulation issued by the Council of the E.U. on the control
of concentrations between undertakings (the Merger Regulation).141 The Merger
Regulation applies to all mergers with a “Community dimension,” defined
primarily in terms of “aggregate worldwide turnover” and “aggregate Communitywide turnover”—that is, aggregate turnover within the E.U. common market—of
the companies planning to merge.142
139

See generally U.S. Department of Justice, “Antitrust Enforcement and the
Consumer,” at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/div_stats/9142.pdf ; Federal Trade
Commission,
“A
Guide
to
the
Federal
Trade
Commission,”
at
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/general/guidetoftc.pdf [hereinafter FTC Guide].
140
See European Commission, “Mission of the Competition DG,” at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/competition/mission; See also European Commission,
“Merger Notification and Procedures Template,” Jul. 2, 2004, at 3, at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/others/20040726template.pdf
[hereinafter
Merger Procedures].
141
See Council Regulation No. 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of
concentrations
between
undertakings,
available
at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/legislation/. This regulation entered into
effect on May 1, 2004, replacing the E.U.’s prior merger regulation. European Commission,
“E.U. gives itself new merger control rules for 21st century,” press release dated Jan. 20,
2004, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/legislation/regulation/.
142
The preamble of the Merger Regulation states that E.U. merger regulations are for
governing “those concentrations which may significantly impede effective competition in the
common market or
in a substantial part of it.” Preamble, sec. 5. More precisely, Art. 1, sec. 2 of the Merger
Regulation provides:
“A concentration has a Community dimension where: (a) the combined aggregate worldwide
turnover of all the undertakings concerned is more than EUR 5,000 million; and (b) the
aggregate Community-wide turnover of each of at least two of the undertakings concerned is
more than EUR 250 million, unless each of the undertakings concerned achieves more than
two-thirds of its aggregate Community-wide turnover within one and the same Member
state.”
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Companies planning a merger with a Community dimension must notify the
DGC and provide it with substantial information relevant to the transaction prior to
the closing of the transaction.143 The DGC then examines the notification to
determine whether or not the merger is “compatible with the common market.” A
merger “which would significantly impede effective competition, in the common
market or in a substantial part of it, in particular as a result of the creation or
strengthening of a dominant position, shall be declared incompatible with the
common market”144 and will be prohibited.145 Ordinarily, the DGC must reach its
decision within twenty-five working days following the receipt of notification,
although it can increase the time period by an additional ninety working days if it
determines that an in-depth inquiry is required.146
2.

Merger Review in the U.S.

In the U.S., two agencies, the Department of Justice (DOJ), through its Antitrust
Division, and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), through its Bureau of
Competition, are responsible for competition regulation, including merger
review.147 These agencies enforce the Clayton Act, which prohibits mergers or
acquisitions the effect of which “may be substantially to lessen competition, or to
tend to create a monopoly.”148 In general, the Clayton Act requires that businesses
planning a merger that exceeds a specified size threshold must notify the DOJ and
the FTC of the proposed transaction and wait for a time period (usually thirty days)
Merger Regulation art. 1, sec. 3 adds:
“A concentration that does not meet the thresholds laid down in paragraph 2 has a
Community dimension where: (a) the combined aggregate worldwide turnover of all the
undertakings concerned is more than EUR 2 500 million; (b) in each of at least three
Member States, the combined aggregate turnover of all the undertakings concerned is more
than EUR 100 million; (c) in each of at least three Member States included for the purpose
of point (b), the aggregate turnover of each of at least two of the undertakings concerned is
more than EUR 25 million; and (d) the aggregate Community-wide turnover of each of at
least two of the undertakings concerned is more than EUR 100 million, unless each of the
undertakings concerned achieves more than two-thirds of its aggregate Community-wide
turnover within one and the same Member State.”
143
Merger Regulation, art. 4, sec. 1. Ordinarily, this notification is to occur after the
signing of the merger agreement, but an exception allowing earlier notification is available
when the parties demonstrate a “good faith intention to conclude an agreement.” Merger
Regulation, art. 4, sec. 1.
144
Merger Regulation, art. 2, sec. 3.
145
Merger Regulation, art. 7, sec. 1.
146
Merger Regulation, art. 10, sec. 1 and sec 3. See also European Commission, “New
Merger Regulation frequently asked questions,” press release dated Jan. 20, 2004, available
at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/legislation/regulation/.
147
Federal Trade Commission, “Protecting Competition, Protecting Consumers: A Plain
English
Guide
to
Antitrust
Laws”—
Preface,
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/compguide/index.htm [hereinafter FTC, Protecting Competition].
148
FTC, Protecting Competition—An Antitrust Primer.
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before completing the transaction.149 If either agency decides further examination
is necessary, that agency may make a “second request” for information and extend
the waiting period.150 If the DOJ or FTC finds the proposed transaction may
violate antitrust laws, that agency may seek a court order barring the transaction.151
3.

Competition Policy and Globalization

Globalization and a steep rise in the number of multinational mergers have made
a purely domestic approach to merger regulation untenable. As stated in the final
report of the U.S. International Competition Policy Advisory Committee (ICPAC)
in November 1997, “a key challenge stems from the recognition that law is national
but markets can extend beyond national boundaries.”152 These circumstances
provide incentives for transatlantic cooperation on competition matters. The
general problem is that “[i]nconsistent outcomes and conflicting or burdensome
remedies imposed by multiple jurisdictions may significantly increase transaction
costs.”153
For example, a merger between two companies in state A may have
anticompetitive effects in state B. Thus, both the E.U. and the U.S. apply their
respective antitrust laws, including merger regulations, to transactions outside their
respective borders that may have adverse effects within their respective borders.154
If E.U. and U.S. regulators both find that the merger would have anticompetitive
effects within their respective markets, then E.U. and U.S. regulators would have
an incentive to cooperate to pursue their mutual interest in crafting remedies to
mitigate those effects. Since the merging parties would be incapable of satisfying
149

Federal Trade Commission, “Introductory Guide I to the Premerger Notification
Program,” at 1, at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/hsr/introguides/guide1.pdf [hereinafter FTC
Premerger Guide]. In general, the parties to a merger must file a notification if all of the
following conditions are met: (a) One person has sales or assets of at least $100 million; (b)
The other person has sales or assets of at least $10 million; and (c) As a result of the
transaction, the acquiring person will hold an aggregate amount of stock and assets of the
acquired person valued at more than $50 million; or (d) As a result of the transaction, the
acquiring person will hold an aggregate amount of stock and assets of the acquired person
valued at more than $200 million, regardless of the sales or assets of the acquiring and
acquired persons. Id. at 2-3.
150
Id. at 1.
151
Id. at 2.
152
INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION POLICY ADVISORY COMMITTEE (ICPAC) TO THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL AND ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR ANTITRUST, FINAL REPORT 2
(2000), at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/icpac/finalreport.htm [hereinafter ICPAC, FINAL
REPORT].
153
Id. at 4.
154
Merit E. Janow, Transatlantic Cooperation on Competition Policy, in ANTITRUST
GOES GLOBAL: WHAT FUTURE FOR TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION? 30-31 (Simon J. Evenett
et al. eds. 2000); Youri Devuyst, Transatlantic Competition Relations, in TRANSATLANTIC
GOVERNANCE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 130 (Mark A. Pollack and Gregory C. Shaffer eds.,
2001).
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conflicting sets of remedies, E.U. and U.S. regulators in such cases have a specific
incentive to ensure that their remedies are consistent.
On the other hand, state A and state B may disagree about the effects of a
proposed merger. One state may approve it, and the other may prohibit it. From
the perspective of the companies seeking to merge, this makes the transaction
impossible. Thus, state A and state B in essence have a veto power over mergers
that the other may have approved.155 “The ruling of the most restrictive
jurisdiction with respect to a proposed merger ultimately will prevail.”156 For
example, even though U.S. regulators approved the 2001 proposed merger between
General Electric and Honeywell, two U.S. companies, the E.U. prohibited it,
finding that it would give the merged company a dominant position in relevant
markets.157 The risk of such outcomes provides another strong incentive for
regulators to cooperate with the aim of avoiding contradictory decisions.
B.

Assessing Transgovernmentalism in E.U.-U.S. Merger Review Cooperation

Now that this part of the article has provided some general background on E.U.
and U.S. merger review policy and practices and the impact of globalization on
merger regulation, it proceeds to evaluate the conjectures presented in Part III by
applying them to the case of E.U.-U.S. merger review cooperation. This section
focuses on the dependent variable, transgovernmentalism. As the following
discussion of interstate and transgovernmental elements demonstrates, the level of
transgovernmentalism in E.U.-U.S. merger review cooperation is high.158
1.

Interstate Elements

There is no formal interstate institution governing E.U.-U.S. cooperation on
merger review. There is, however, a series of interstate declarations urging more
transgovernmental cooperation on competition matters in general. First, in 1990,
155

Simon J. Evenett et al., Antitrust Policy in an Evolving Global Marketplace, in
ANTITRUST GOES GLOBAL: WHAT FUTURE FOR TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION? 22 (Simon J.
Evenett et al. eds. 2000).
156
Timothy J. Muris, Merger Enforcement in a World of Multiple Arbiters, remarks
delivered to Brookings Institution, Dec. 21, 2001, at note 33, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/brookings.pdf.
Muris continues, “Consequently,
disagreements among regulators may lead businesses to restrict their merger activity to
transactions that will be acceptable to all jurisdictions. As a result, merger activity may fall
to sub-optimal levels, as businesses are dissuaded from negotiating transactions that most
jurisdictions would view as competitively benign, out of concern that the most restrictive
jurisdiction would block those transactions.” Id.
157
Dimitri Giotakos et al., General Electric/Honeywell - An Insight into the
Commission’s Investigation and Decision, COMPETITION POL’Y NEWSL., Oct. 2001, at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/speeches/text/sp2001_037_en.pdf.
158
This characterization is consistent with prior studies of competition policy
cooperation. See, e.g., Slaughter, Global Economy, supra note 6, at 179 and 191; and
Raustiala, supra note 8, at 35-44.
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U.S. President George Bush and European Commission President Jacques Delors
signed the Transatlantic Declaration on E.C.-U.S. Relations (TAD).159 The TAD
declared that the E.U. and U.S. would continue to develop dialog on matters
including competition policy.160
In 1995, Jacques Santer, President of the European Commission, Felipe
Gonzalez, President of the E.U. Council of Ministers and Prime Minister of Spain,
and President Bill Clinton of the United States, endorsed the New Transatlantic
Agenda (NTA).161 The NTA states that the E.U. and U.S. “will address in
appropriate fora problems where trade intersects with . . . competition policy.”162
In the accompanying Joint E.U.-U.S. Action Plan, the parties stated they:
will pursue work on the scope for multilateral action in the fields of trade and
competition policy. Our competition authorities will cooperate in working with
other countries to develop effective antitrust regimes. . . . We will pursue, and build
on, bilateral cooperation in the immediate term based on the E.C.-U.S. Agreement
of 1991 [discussed below]. We will examine the options for deepening cooperation
on competition matters, including the possibility of a further agreement.163
At the London E.U.-U.S. Summit of May 18, 1998, President Bill Clinton, Prime
Minister Tony Blair, and Commission president Santer issued a statement on the
Transatlantic Economic Partnership (TEP).164 In this statement, the E.U. and U.S.
agreed to “exchange views inter alia on issues relating to the question of
multilateral rules on competition law and its enforcement, and on means of
enhancing international cooperation among competition authorities in relation to
anticompetitive practices with a significant impact on international trade and
investment,” at upcoming World Trade Organization (WTO) meetings. The E.U.
and the U.S. also stated that they “will continue to explore possibilities for further
cooperation in the implementation of [E.U. and U.S.] competition laws.”165

159

Pollack & Shaffer, supra note 22, at 14.
Transatlantic
Declaration
on
E.C.-U.S.
Relations,
available
at
http://europa.eu.int/en/agenda/eu-us/pub/decl.html.
161
“A New Era For Transatlantic Relations,” European Union press release dated
December 3, 1995, available at http://europa.eu.int/en/agenda/tr02.html.
162
New Transatlantic Agenda, available at http://www.eurunion.org/partner/agenda.htm.
163
Joint
E.U.-U.S.
Action
Plan,
available
at
http://www.eurunion.org/partner/actplan.htm.
164
White House Office of Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: The Transatlantic Economic
Partnership,
May
18,
1998,
available
at
http://www.useu.be/TransAtlantic/TEP/partn518.html.
165
Links to the full text of the TAD, NTA and TEP are available from the E.U.
Commission’s
website:
for
the
TAD,
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/us/economic_partnership/declaration_1990.htm
;
for
the
NTA,
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/us/new_transatlantic_agenda/index.htm;
and
for
the
TEP,
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/us/economic_partnership/trans_econ_partner_1
160
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In summary, the E.U. and U.S. have made statements at the interstate level that
they will cooperate on competition matters, particularly as they relate to trade. The
cooperation called for in these statements, however, is principally
transgovernmental, and these E.U.-U.S. statements do not mention merger review.
Nevertheless, this evidence suggests that E.U. and U.S. heads of state generally are
supportive, at least in principle, of transgovernmental cooperation on competition
matters.
2.

Transgovernmental Elements

There is considerable transgovernmental cooperation between the E.U. and the
U.S. on merger review matters, as evidenced by formal agreements, cooperation on
specific merger review cases, and expert accounts. In September 1991, European
Competition Commissioner Sir Leon Brittan, U.S. Attorney General William P.
Barr and Federal Trade Commission Chairman Janet D. Steiger signed the
“Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the
Commission of the European Communities regarding the application of their
competition laws” (the 1991 Agreement).166 The 1991 Agreement contains
guidelines for notification by the parties to each other “whenever its competition
authorities become aware that their enforcement activities may affect important
interests of the other Party”; the exchange of information by “appropriate officials
from the competition authorities of each party”; coordination by competition
authorities in enforcement activities; and prompt consultation at the request of
either party “at the appropriate level, which may include consultations between the
heads of the competition authorities concerned.”167
In 1999, E.U. and U.S. competition authorities adopted the “Administrative
Arrangement on Attendance” (AAA), which provides guidelines for “reciprocal
attendance at certain stages of the procedures in individual cases involving the

1_98.htm.
166
Europe Information Service, European Report, “EEC/U.S.: Competition Pact Aims
for New Level of Cooperation,” Sept. 25, 1991. The text of the 1991 Agreement is available
at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/international/bilateral/documents/us3_en.html.
167
1991 Agreement, art. II(1), art. III(2), art. IV(1) and art. VII(1). The 1991 Agreement
is an executive agreement under U.S. law, meaning that it was not ratified by the Senate. As
such, it is a formal, binding international agreement. Unlike a treaty, however, an executive
agreement does not override any provisions of U.S. law with which it may be inconsistent.
Moreover, unlike many other executive agreements, the 1991 Agreement was not entered
into by the U.S. president. Rather, it was entered into by the FTC and DOJ on behalf of the
U.S. government, after being approved by the Department of State. Similarly, on the
European side it was signed by the Competition Commissioner. Only after the European
Court of Justice held in 1994 that the European Commission was not competent to conclude
the 1991 Agreement did the E.U. Council approve the agreement, effective as of its original
signing. John J. Parisi, Enforcement Cooperation among Antitrust Authorities, May 19,
1999, at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/ibc99059911update.htm; Devuyst, supra note
154, at 134-136.
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application of their respective competition rules”.168 In October 2001, FTC
Chairman Timothy J. Muris and Assistant Attorney General Charles A. James, E.U.
Competition Commissioner Mario Monti, and other antitrust authorities endorsed
the creation of the International Competition Network (ICN) to provide a venue
where senior antitrust officials from developed and developing countries will work
to reach consensus on proposals for procedural and substantive convergence in
antitrust enforcement.169 The ICN has established a working group aimed at
addressing “the challenges of merger review in a multi-jurisdictional context.”170
In addition to providing a central source of information about participants’ merger
review rules and procedures, the working group has produced a variety of
guidelines and recommended practices to facilitate cooperation and regulatory
convergence.171
In October 2002, FTC Chairman Muris, Assistant Attorney General James, and
E.U. Competition Commissioner Monti, released a set of “best practices”
containing detailed guidelines for coordinating merger reviews (Best Practices).172
The Best Practices include provisions for coordination on timing, collection and
evaluation of evidence, communication between reviewing agencies, and crafting
remedies and settlements.173 The Best Practices were a product of the U.S.-E.U.

168

See
“Background
information-United
States
of
America,”
at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/international/bilateral/background/us1_en.html. On
June 4, 1998, Attorney General Janet Reno and Federal Trade Commission Chairman Robert
Pitofsky, on behalf of the United States and Karel Van Miert, European Commissioner for
Competition Policy, and Margaret Beckett, the United Kingdom’s Secretary of State for
Trade and Industry on behalf of the Council of the European Union, signed an “Agreement
between the European Communities and the Government of the United States of America on
the Application of Positive Comity Principles in the Enforcement of Their Competition
Laws” (the 1998 Agreement). The 1998 Agreement does not, however, apply to mergers.
Federal Trade Commission press release, June 4, 1998, “United States and European
Communities Sign Agreement on ‘Positive Comity’ in Antitrust Enforcement.”
www.ftc.gov/opa/1998/06/positive.htm.
169
See Federal Trade Commission press release dated October 25, 2001, “U.S. and
Foreign Antitrust Officials Launch International Competition Network,” at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2001/10/icn.htm. The ICN’s website, where the full text of the
memorandum
establishing
the
ICN
can
be
found,
is
www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org.
170
See International Competition Network, Merger Review Working Group at
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/mergers.html.
171
See International Competition Network, Merger Review Working Group, Merger
Documents, at http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/mergersdocuments.html.
172
Federal Trade Commission, United States and European Union Antitrust Agencies
Issue “Best Practices” for Coordinating Merger Reviews, Press Release dated Oct. 30, 2002,
available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/10/eugidelines.htm. This press release has a link to
the full text of the Best Practices.
173
The full text of the Best Practices on Cooperation in Merger Investigations
[hereinafter “Best Practices”] is at www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/10/mergerbestpractices.htm.
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Merger Working Group, which is a group of lawyers and economists from the FTC,
the DOJ’s Antitrust Division, and the E.U.174
In addition to these formal statements, there has been substantial interaction
between E.U. and U.S. competition regulators in merger review activities. In 1997
alone, the E.U. notified the U.S. of thirty-one merger investigations that implicated
U.S. interests, and the U.S. notified the E.U. of twenty merger investigations,
which means that almost half of the merger matters before the FTC that year
involved some level of interaction with foreign competition authorities.175
Between 1991 and 1999, E.U. and U.S. antitrust agencies contacted each other in
689 antitrust cases, including 473 merger cases that had a transatlantic
dimension.176 According to FTC Chairman Muris, there were seventy-five merger
cases during this time period where there was communication between E.U. and
U.S. regulators that confirmed decisions to clear, clear with undertakings, or
challenge proposed mergers.177 E.U. and U.S. regulators also have cooperated on
crafting consistent remedies in several merger cases, such as WorldCom/MCI,
Guinness/GrandMetropolitan and Dresser/Halliburton.178
Cooperation can not only enhance coordination on remedies, but also help avoid
unnecessary duplication of work and costs, “both for the competition authorities
involved and for the businesses whose conduct is subject to review.”179 For
example, in the Dresser/Halliburton merger in 1998, involving two U.S. companies,
the Commission was kept informed about remedy negotiations but deferred to U.S.
regulators in negotiating an acceptable divestiture. “Although it had to formally
approve the merger, the Commission could do so without much additional action,
explicitly taking into account the remedies obtained by the U.S. authorities.”180
This evidence of transgovernmental cooperation is consistent with the findings
of practitioners and other experts. On the E.U. side, Alexander Schaub, formerly
the European Commission’s Director General for competition, commented that
“staff level contacts have become a daily routine in our work” and noted that
merger control is “the area where daily U.S.-E.U. cooperation has reached the most

174
Federal Trade Commission press release dated October 30, 2002, “United States and
European Union Antitrust Agencies Issue ‘Best Practices’ for Coordinating Merger
Review.” www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/10/euguidelines.htm.
175
Janow, supra note154, at 42.
176
Devuyst, supra note 154, at 138.
177
Muris, supra note 156, at note 15.
178
Devuyst, supra note 154, at 139 and 141. Devuyst distinguishes between two types
of cases that are dealt with in transatlantic merger cooperation. First, there are mergers
involving a “truly transatlantic (or global) market.” Second, there are transatlantic mergers
that involve separate national markets. Devuyst explains that cooperation on both types of
mergers focuses on coordinating the remedies with which the merging companies must
comply in order for the merger to be approved by regulators. Id. at 139.
179
Id. at 131-132.
180
Id. at 141.
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advanced stage.”181 On the U.S. side, former FTC Chairman Robert Pitofsky noted
in 2000 that “virtually all knowledgeable observers agree that there has been
substantial convergence in the method and content of merger enforcement in the
E.C. and U.S., and a remarkable improvement in coordination and cooperation
between the two enforcement authorities” and that this was a result of “thoughtful
and intensive efforts” of antitrust regulators on both sides of the Atlantic.182
John Parisi, Counsel for European Union Affairs in the International Antitrust
Division of the FTC, described E.U.-U.S. antitrust cooperation as follows:
The process . . . is conducted and overseen by professional staff in the
international departments of the agencies. These public servants are grounded in
their own agency’s law and practices and have acquired expertise about other
systems. They have gotten to know and trust their counterparts and they serve as
the diplomats who bring together the investigative staffs and help to bridge
language, knowledge, and analytical gaps between the investigators.183
Similarly, Columbia University professor and antitrust attorney Merit Janow
summarizes E.U.-U.S. cooperation as follows:
[C]ooperation between U.S. and European competition authorities appears to
have deepened and broadened and become regularized. Such cooperation has
not, however, become formulaic. Interaction between officials at all levels is
now commonplace. Discussion can include a review of product markets,
timing of respective procedures, and consideration of relevant geographic
markets. In a number of cases, [DGC] and FTC staffs share their views on
the appropriate definition of product and geographic markets, possible
competitive effects, and potential remedies.184
In summary, formal agreements, cooperation on specific merger review cases,
and expert accounts indicate that levels of transgovernmentalism are high in E.U.U.S. merger cooperation.
3.

Assessment

The foregoing evidence suggests that E.U.-U.S. merger review cooperation is
181

See Alexander Schaub, “Co-operation in Competition Policy Enforcement between
the E.U. and the U.S. and New Concepts Evolving at the World Trade Organisation and the
International Competition Network,” Apr. 4, 2002, at 9-10, available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/speeches/text/sp2002_013_en.pdf.
182
Robert Pitofsky, “E.U. and U.S. Approaches to International Mergers—Views from
the U.S. Federal Trade Commission” (pt. III(B)(1)), Sept. 14-15, 2000, available at
www.ftc.gov/speeches/pitofsky/pitintermergers.htm.
183
See John J. Parisi, Enforcement Cooperation among Antitrust Authorities, May 19,
1999, available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/ibc99059911update.htm.
184
Janow, supra note 154, at 42; see also Merit E. Janow, Transatlantic Regulatory
Cooperation in Competition Policy: The Case for ‘Soft Harmonization’ and Multilateralism
over New Bilateral U.S.-E.U. Institutions, in TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY COOPERATION:
LEGAL PROBLEMS AND POLITICAL PROSPECTS 256 (George A. Bermann et al. eds., 2000).
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primarily transgovernmental. More specifically, the evidence suggests that this
transgovernmental cooperation is what Slaughter would refer to as “spontaneous”
transgovernmentalism in that it arises above all from agreements among domestic
regulatory agencies (such as the 1991 Agreement, the AAA, and the Best Practices)
and with relatively little interstate involvement.185 Alternatively, although the
TAD, NTA and TEP do not expressly refer to merger review cooperation, they
might be understood as providing the basis for Slaughter’s second type of
transgovernmentalism, that which arises within a framework agreed upon by heads
of state.186
C.

Explaining Transgovernmentalism in E.U.-U.S. Merger Cooperation
1.

Distribution Problems

Even if the E.U. and the U.S. generally agree on the overarching goals of merger
review policy and recognize that they both can gain from merger review
cooperation, they do not necessarily agree completely on what the best policies are
for accomplishing those goals. There are some differences between the preferences
of the E.U. and the U.S. regarding the exact policies around which they should
coordinate their merger review activities. These differences introduce a moderate
level of distribution problems into E.U.-U.S. merger review cooperation.
These differences relate to both substantive and procedural preferences.
Substantively, there are, for example, different views regarding the treatment of
government subsidies, analysis of mergers involving vertical integration, and the
scope of business activity that is subject to review.187 Moreover, “the E.U. has
displayed considerably less appreciation [than the U.S.] for merger defenses based

185

See supra Part II.B.
See supra Part II.B. However, at least one expert doubts the importance of these
interstate elements, arguing that competition cooperation emerged independently from the
NTA the TEP. Devuyst, supra note 154, at 127. Devuyst suggests that “the frequent
gatherings of FTC, Department of Justice, and European Commission officials” has been
more important than the interstate legal framework for fostering cooperation.” Id. at 134.
187
Devuyst, supra note 154, at 143-146; see also Bevin MB Newman and Marta
Delgado Echevarria, Gaps and Bridges: Transatlantic Cooperation, EUR. ANTITRUST REV.
26,
27
(2005)
(quoting
commissioner
Mario
Monti),
available
at
http://www.globalcompetitionreview.com/ear/eu_us.cfm; see, e.g., Debra A. Valentine &
Raj De, Transatlantic Similarities and Differences in Merger Policy: How the United States
and the European Union Evaluate Transactions 4-5, BUS. ECON., Oct. 2002, available at
http://www.findarticles.com/cf_dls/m1094/4_37/94774173/print.jhtml; Philip Mardsen, The
Divide on Verticals, in ANTITRUST GOES GLOBAL: WHAT FUTURE FOR TRANSATLANTIC
COOPERATION? chap. 6 (Simon J. Evenett et al. eds. 2000). An example regarding the scope
of business activity covered by E.U. and U.S. antitrust law is given by Muris: some
exclusive agreements such as exclusive territorial rights agreements may be unlawful in the
E.U. but permitted in the U.S. Muris, supra note 156.
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on efficiency arguments.”188 Procedurally, there are differences regarding the
treatment of confidential information, the timing of merger review, the involvement
in the review process of competitors of the parties proposing to merge, and the role
of the judiciary in merger review enforcement.189 In the view of one U.S.
regulator, “the similarities among competition laws and their enforcement are
greater than their differences.”190 Similarly, in the words of former FTC Chairman
Muris, “[w]e should . . . keep the impact of those differences in perspective. They
are too great to ignore, but not so great as to jeopardize either most transatlantic
business activity or transatlantic antitrust enforcement cooperation.”191
These examples and expert observations suggest that E.U.-U.S. merger review
cooperation is not a Simple Coordination game such as the one depicted in Figure
1: even though the E.U. and the U.S. have a common interest in avoiding the Pareto
suboptimal 0 payoffs associated with non-cooperation and generally have the same
goals regarding merger review, they are not indifferent as to the choice of policy
used to pursue those goals. Thus, E.U.-U.S. merger review cooperation is probably
more like the Battle of the Sexes game depicted in Figure 2. The upper-left cell
might represent the E.U.’s preferred policy option, and the lower-right cell the
U.S.’s preferred policy option.
The payoffs illustrate the distributional
consequences of the choice between the two policies: whereas the E.U. gets a
payoff of 3 if the agreement is on its preferred policy, it only gets a payoff of 2 if
the agreement is on the U.S.’s preferred policy. This analysis suggests that E.U.U.S. merger review cooperation does involve moderate distribution problems.
2.

Preference Heterogeneity

E.U.-U.S. merger review cooperation involves a low level of preference
heterogeneity. The E.U. and the U.S. generally agree on the overarching policy
goal of merger review: to prevent business combinations that have anticompetitive
effects. The preamble of the Merger Regulation expresses the E.U.’s goal of
ensuring that mergers “[do] not result in lasting damage to competition.” Similarly,
the U.S. Clayton Act’s merger provisions are aimed at preventing transactions the
effect of which “may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a
monopoly.”192
The similarity of the merger review policy goals of the E.U. and the U.S. are
also evident is less formal agency statements. According to the FTC:
Most mergers actually benefit competition and consumers by allowing firms
to operate more efficiently. In a competitive market, firms pass on these

188

Evenett et al., supra note 155, at 20.
Devuyst, supra note 154, at 147-148; Newman & Echevarria, supra note 187, at 28;
Valentine & De, supra note 187.
190
Parisi, supra note 167, at section I.
191
Muris, supra note 156, at 1.
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15 U.S.C. 18 (sec. 7 of the Clayton Antitrust Act (1914).
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lower costs to consumers. But some mergers, by reducing competition, can
cost consumers many millions of dollars every year in the form of higher
prices and reduced product quality, consumer choice and innovation. The
Bureau of Competition reviews mergers to determine which ones have the
potential to harm consumers; thoroughly investigates those that may be
troublesome; and recommends enforcement action to the Commission when
necessary to protect competition and consumers.193
Likewise, according to the DGC:
The control of mergers and acquisitions is one of the pillars of European
Union competition policy. When companies combine via a merger, an
acquisition or the creation of a joint venture, this generally has a positive
impact on markets: firms usually become more efficient, competition
intensifies and the final consumer will benefit from higher-quality goods at
fairer prices. However, mergers which create or strengthen a dominant
market position are prohibited in order to prevent ensuing abuses. A firm is
in a dominant position when it is able to act on the market without having to
take account of the reaction of its competitors, suppliers or customers. In a
dominant position a firm can, for example, increase its prices above those of
its competitors without fearing any loss of profit.194
It would be difficult to place the merger review policy goals of the E.U. and the
U.S. precisely in an abstract one-dimensional policy space such as the one depicted
in Figure 3. The similarities between the legal and informal statements of policy
goals discussed above indicate, however, that the preferences of the E.U. and the
U.S. would be better represented by points a and b, which are relatively close to
each other, than points a’ and b’. In summary, in the words of one E.U.
competition official, E.U. and U.S. merger review rules “are—in most respects—
pursuing the same objectives.”195 “Put simply, the E.U. and U.S. agree on what
competition policy should be all about.”196
3.

Enforcement Problems

E.U.-U.S. merger review cooperation involves a low level of enforcement
problems. Even if there might be payoff structures associated with the review of
certain mergers that may create a Prisoners’ Dilemma situation in which defection
is the dominant strategy, E.U.-U.S. merger review cooperation is not a single-play
193

“Guide
to
the
Federal
Trade
Commission.”
www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/general/guidetoftc.htm.
194
See “Citizen’s Guide to Competition Policy - Control of major cross-border mergers,”
available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/citizen/citizen_mergers_en.html. This is
not to say that there cannot be problems of preference heterogeneity in specific cases. See
discussion of high politics below.
195
Valentine & De, supra note 187, at 2.
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Newman and Echevarria, supra note 187, at 26.
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game. To the contrary, there is iteration—year after year, the E.U. and the U.S. are
presented with opportunities to cooperate on the review of various mergers—and,
as noted above, enforcement problems generally are less severe when there is
iteration.
In addition, the depth of cooperation in E.U.-U.S. merger review cooperation
appears to be relatively low because none of the arrangements discussed above
require the parties to make fundamental changes to how they regulate
competition.197 For example, the TAD, NTA and TEP are nonbinding declarations
of intent. The 1991 Agreement states that it shall not be interpreted “in a manner
inconsistent with the existing laws, or as requiring any change in the laws, of the
United States of America or the European Communities or of their respective
States or Member States.” The 1991 Agreement also allows the parties to take their
“own national interests into account in determining whether and to what extent to
provide cooperation in any given matter.”198 Similarly, the Best Practices state that
they are “intended to set forth an advisory framework for interagency cooperation”
and “the agencies reserve their full discretion in the implementation of these best
practices and nothing in this document is intended to create any enforceable
rights.”199 For these reasons, it does not appear that E.U.-U.S. merger review
cooperation entails serious enforcement problems.
4.

High Politics

Using traditional concepts of “high” and “low” politics, E.U.-U.S. antitrust
cooperation involves low politics since it is in the realm of economic regulation and
business, not national security or military affairs. This would seem to be an
accurate characterization, but only with the qualification that, in specific merger
cases, issues of high politics may emerge. For example, both E.U. and U.S.
antitrust authorities asserted jurisdiction over the proposed Boeing-McDonnell
Douglas merger, even though neither Boeing nor McDonnell Douglas had any
production assets in the E.U. “It provoked nationalistic responses in both the
United States and Europe, with politicians accusing each other of supporting their
own national champion. . . [T]he case demonstrates that when important interests
are involved (and nationalistic sentiments invoked) interagency cooperation may
not be sufficient to avoid conflict and surmount differences.”200 U.S. government
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Recall the definition of “depth” given above, which is based on Downs et al., supra
note 110. The author does not use this term to imply that the cooperation between E.U. and
U.S. regulators is unimportant or minor; to the contrary, the evidence shows that it is
important and extensive. The case of E.U.-U.S. merger review shows that regulatory
cooperation does not have to require great changes in state behavior or high levels of
obligation in order to yield substantial benefits to both parties and sustained patterns of
interaction.
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Janow, supra note 154, at 35.
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Janow, supra note 154, at 44-45. The United States House of Representatives, in its
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officials were concerned that prohibiting the proposed merger would harm U.S.
defense interests.201 The U.S. House of Representatives even got involved, voting
416-2 in favor of a resolution warning the E.U. against “an unwarranted and
unprecedented interference in a U.S. business transaction.”202 Although this is an
exceptional case and an arrangement was finally made whereby both the E.U. and
U.S. ultimately approved the merger,203 it is important to note that even a
quintessentially “low politics” issue like competition policy can at times take on a
high politics dimension that can limit the potential of transgovernmental
cooperation.
5.

Issue Complexity

E.U.-U.S. merger review cooperation involves a high level of complexity—both
legal204 and economic.205 In both Europe and the U.S., competition policy is the
domain of highly specialized economists and lawyers who represent businesses in
the private sector and the government in regulatory agencies. This complexity is
magnified in the transatlantic context because the E.U. and U.S. each have their
own competition laws, policies and procedures and use different types of economic
analysis to evaluate mergers that need to be taken into account when designing

Resolution No. 191 (1997), available at http://thomas.loc.gov, stated that “the European
Commission is apparently determined to disapprove the [Boeing/McDonnell Douglas]
merger to gain an unfair competitive advantage for Airbus Industries, a government-owned
aircraft manufacturer.”
201
Devuyst, supra note 154, at 143.
202
House Resolution 191, adopted July 22, 1997, available at http://thomas.loc.gov;
“Case Study: The Boeing-McDonnell Merger,” Economic Perspectives, USIA Electronic
Journal,
Vol.
4,
No.
1,
February
1999,
at
http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/ites/0299/ijee/boeing.htm.
203
See Thomas L. Boeder, The Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Merger, in ANTITRUST GOES
GLOBAL: WHAT FUTURE FOR TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION? 139 (Simon J. Evenett et al.
eds., 2000).
204
For an overview of the legal complexities of merger review, see, e.g., James S. Venit
& William J. Kolasky, Substantive Convergence and Procedural Dissonance in Merger
Review, in Antitrust Goes Global: What Future for Transatlantic Cooperation? 79-97 (Simon
J. Evenett et al. eds., 2000).
205
For an overview of the economics of merger review, see, e.g., Edward M. Graham,
Economic Considerations in Merger Review, in ANTITRUST GOES GLOBAL: WHAT FUTURE
FOR TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION? 57-78 (Simon J. Evenett et al. eds., 2000) Links to E.U.
merger
review
laws,
regulations
and
procedures
may
be
found
at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/citizen/citizen_mergers_en.html. An overview of
U.S. antitrust law is available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/foia/divisionmanual/ch2.htm, and
links to U.S. merger review laws, regulations and procedures may be found at
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/hsr/hsr.htm. For an overview of the complexities of merger review on
both sides of the Atlantic, see, e.g., Valentine and De, supra note 187, and ICPAC, supra
note 129.
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consistent remedies or developing work sharing arrangements.206
In addition to the legal expertise required by regulators to apply complex laws
and regulations, economic expertise is required to perform tasks including
definition of the geographic scope of relevant markets; modeling anticipated
economic effects of business transactions; determining implications for market
power; assessing efficiency gains and losses, and competitive restraints; and
formulating remedies that will mitigate adverse economic effects. Depending on
the types of businesses proposing to merge, expertise in the economics of different
business sectors also is required. This expertise must be applied to reach merger
decisions within limited timeframes imposed by E.U. and U.S. procedural
requirements.
This complexity appears to be increasing. As noted in recent FTC testimony,
new technologies and the rise of the knowledge-based economy are causing
mergers to grow in size, scope and complexity, making it necessary for regulators
to undertake even more extensive review of proposed mergers.207
6.

Agency Autonomy

The DOJ, FTC and DGC are moderately autonomous. On the one hand, they are
under a legal duty to act independently on the basis of applicable law when
reviewing proposed mergers.208 On the other hand, “[t]his does not mean that
traditional state structures have simply and completely abdicated all powers in this
area.”209 In high profile cases high-level state leaders may attempt to put pressure
on regulators to reach certain outcomes.210 Moreover, “[t]he U.S. Congress
frequently summons FTC and [DOJ] officials to give testimony in formal hearings
on antitrust problems. Similarly, the European commissioner in charge of
competition policy is regularly grilled in the European Parliament.”211 The
European Court of Justice can also limit the European Commission’s freedom of
action, as it did when it ruled that it was for the European Council, not the
Commission, to conclude the 1991 Agreement with the U.S.212 Thus, while E.U.
and U.S. regulators are technically independent, their autonomy is not unlimited.
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See, e.g., Evenett et al., supra note 155.
Federal Trade Commission, “An Overview of Federal Trade Commission Antitrust
Activities,” Testimony before Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Antitrust,
Competition, and Business and Consumer Rights, United States Senate, Sept. 19, 2002,
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Antecedent Interaction in International Organizations

There has been a moderate level of interaction among European and U.S.
competition regulators in international organizations that predates the currently
high levels of bilateral regulatory cooperation.213 For example, European and U.S.
regulators have been interacting with each other in the context of the Organization
for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD) for some time. The OECD
has been a multilateral forum for discussing cooperation on anticompetitive
practices affecting international trade since as early as 1967, and in 1999 the
OECD’s Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise Affairs issued
recommended guidelines for transnational merger notifications.214 In addition,
since 1999 the OECD has issued a variety of best practices addressing various
aspects of the merger review process. The E.U. has been eager to establish the
WTO as a forum for cooperation on antitrust matters and negotiation of core
principles of competition law to be enforced by the WTO, but the U.S. has resisted
these efforts.215 As a result, discussion of antitrust policy in the WTO context has
been significant, but limited.216
D.

Evaluating the Conjectures

In summary, based on the foregoing evidence, Part IV has estimated that the
level of transgovernmentalism, the dependent variable, is high in the case of E.U.U.S. merger review cooperation. Regarding the explanatory variables, this part has
estimated that distribution problems are moderate; preference heterogeneity is low;
enforcement problems are low; the extent of “high politics” is generally low, but
with notable exceptions; issue complexity is high; agency autonomy is moderate;
and the level of antecedent interaction in international organizations is moderate.
These results are presented in Table 1 below, and compared to the values expected
by each of my conjectures when transgovernmentalism is high.
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As noted above, such interactions actually constitute, and therefore cannot be
considered a cause, of Slaughter’s first type of transgovernmentalism (government networks
within international organizations). It may be, however, an independent cause of the other
types of transgovernmentalism.
214
Parisi, supra note 167, at section II; Devuyst, supra note 154, at 133. Access to these
documents is available from the OECD’s website, www.oecd.org.
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Devuyst, supra note 154, at 133; Evenett et al., supra note 155, at 18.
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Table 1
Evaluating Conjectures about Levels of Transgovernmentalism
Conjecture
Case Study
Distribution Problems
Low
Moderate
Preference Heterogeneity Low
Low
Enforcement Problems
Low
Low
High Politics
Low
Low/Moderate
Issue Complexity
High
High
Agency Autonomy
High
Moderate
Antecedent Interactions
High
Moderate
As the table illustrates, the results are generally consistent with the conjectures
about the determinants of the structure of legal and regulatory cooperation. The
findings regarding preference heterogeneity, enforcement problems and issue
complexity are as expected, while the case is less clear-cut regarding distribution
problems, high politics, agency autonomy, and antecedent interactions in
international organizations. The implication of these findings is that this article’s
rational design theory of transgovernmentalism may be a plausible one. However,
additional cases must be examined before reaching more definitive conclusions; in
the meantime, these results should be considered preliminary.
V. CONCLUSION
Legal and regulatory cooperation can be transgovernmental or interstate. These
are fundamentally different forms of cooperation. The former involves crossborder interactions among different states’ regulatory agencies and the lawyers and
regulators that staff them, whereas the latter consists of interactions among states
represented by heads of state and behaving as unitary actors. These two forms of
cooperation are not, however, mutually exclusive. To the contrary, international
cooperation between states in a given issue area is likely to have both
transgovernmental and interstate dimensions. Scholars including Anne-Marie
Slaughter have documented and explained the rise of transgovernmentalism in
general. The goal of this article, however, has been to help explain how and why
levels of transgovernmentalism vary across different groups of states and different
issue areas.
To pursue that goal, this article has proposed a rational design theory of
transgovernmentalism. The theory posits that transgovernmental versus interstate
cooperation is a rational design choice made by heads of state and regulators taking
into account the costs and benefits of the two forms of cooperation under a given
set of circumstances. This article then used the theory to derive a series of
conjectures regarding what types of circumstances matter for the design choice and
how.
More precisely, the conjectures were that relative levels of
transgovernmentalism are likely to be lower when there are more serious
distribution, preference heterogeneity and enforcement problems because interstate
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forms of cooperation offer solutions to these problems that transgovernmental
forms generally are less capable of providing; lower in issue areas involving high
politics; and higher when issue complexity, agency autonomy and the extent of
prior regulatory interactions in international organizations are high. The case of
E.U.-U.S. merger review cooperation is generally consistent with these conjectures,
although more so with the conjectures regarding preference heterogeneity,
enforcement problems and issue complexity.
This article, however, represents only the first step in the development of the
rational design theory of transgovernmentalism. Further progress will require both
additional theoretical and empirical work. Theoretically, one of the principal
questions is the extent to which the role of domestic political actors should be taken
into account. This article has consistently treated heads of state and regulators as
the exclusive designers of international cooperation. In the delegation context the
theory has treated heads of state as the sole principals and it has treated regulators
as the agents. As noted above, this is a substantial simplification of reality. Other
domestic political actors, particularly legislatures and interest groups, may also
play an important role in influencing the structure of international cooperation. In
addition, in terms of delegation, legislatures rather than heads of state may be the
real principals in some cases of international cooperation. The challenge is to
determine whether the reduced theoretical parsimony that would result from
incorporating these additional domestic political actors would be outweighed by
deeper insights about the determinants of levels of transgovernmentalism.217
Connecting the realms of theory and empirics is the question of
operationalization: how can the conceptual variables in the theory and in the
conjectures derived from the theory be empirically measured? Concepts like issue
complexity and enforcement problems are of considerable theoretical importance,
but to what extent can they be measured in a consistent manner from case to case?
Developing improved techniques for reliably and consistently operationalizing the
variables used in this article is an important objective.
Empirically, to move beyond a preliminary plausibility test of the rational design
theory of transgovernmentalism, additional case studies will be necessary. The
case studies would ideally be selected to ensure a sampling across different issue
areas and different groups of states, and to ensure variation in the values of the
explanatory variables without regard to levels of transgovernmentalism.218
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In addition, alternative theories of transgovernmentalism should also be explored.
See, e.g., Kal Raustiala’s theory in his 2002 article on transgovernmental networks and
international law. Raustiala, supra note 9.
218
KING, KEOHANE & VERBA, supra note 138, at 140 (“the best ‘intentional’ [research]
design selects observations to ensure variation in the explanatory variable . . . without regard
to the values of the dependent variables. Only during the research do we discover the values
of the dependent variable and then make our initial causal inference by examining the
differences in the distribution of outcomes on the dependent variable for given values of the
explanatory variables”).
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Interesting case studies might range from cooperation on the regulation of
corporate securities, environmental regulation and trade regulation to peace keeping
and collective security.
It is important to seek a better understanding of international legal and regulatory
cooperation. Such understanding can enhance the ability to design effective
frameworks for cooperation. It can improve the ability to manage and, when
deemed appropriate, to facilitate the activities of transgovernmental networks.
Moreover, because transgovernmentalism has serious implications not only for
cooperation across borders but also for governance within borders, the structure of
legal and regulatory cooperation has both international and domestic importance.
In this new world order, this research agenda is well worth pursuing.

